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The New Prometheus: Will Scientific Inquiry be 
Bound by the Chains of Government Regulation? 
David Favre 
Matthew McKinnon 
''Eppur si muove" 
- Galileo GalileP 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Prometheus of ancient lore stole fire from the gods, delivering 
it to mankind to allow men to protect themselves from Zeus.2 Today, 
science, like the mythical Titan, is discovering the secrets of the 
universe and delivering them to mankind for its betterment. For Pro-
metheus' efforts in helping an unworthy mankind, Zeus had him chained 
to a crag in Scythia at the ends of the earth. Will the government of 
today demand an equivalent price of science? In return for the benefits 
of fire, Zeus extracted a heavy price from mankind: he sent them Pan-
dora's box filled with evil, disease, and hardship. Will the price that 
present society pays for the benefits of science be equally high? 
Until recently there has been very little desire expressed to control 
science. Society has been indifferent to the activities of scientists in 
their labs and has generally accepted the benefits of science. Never-
theless, it is recognized that the process as well as the product of 
science can present society with potential risks of harm. 
Consider for a moment some of the various areas with which science 
is grappling: the deciphering of the genetic code of the DNA molecule,3 
the creation of human life outside the womb,4 research on fetal 
EDITOR'S NOTE: The authors are professors of law at The Detroit College of Law. 
David S. Favre, B.S. (Chemistry), University of Virginia (1968); J.D., College of William 
and Mary (1973). Matthew C. McKinnon, B.S. (Physics), University of Detroit (1961), J.D. 
Detroit College of Law (1972). 
1. "And yet it does move." Legend has it that Galileo muttered this defiantly in 
response to the demand of the Inquisition that he repudiate the Copernican Heliocentric 
Theory of the Universe. This phase marked but the first round in the continuing confron-
tation between the truth-seeking enterprise of scientffic inquiry and the government. See 
W. DURANT & A. DURANT, THE AGE OF REASON BEGINS 600-12 (1961). 
2. See E. TRIPP, HANDBOOK OF CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY 499-501 (1970). 
3. See notes 220-27 and accompaning text infra. 
4. See note 165 and accompanying text infra for a discussion on external human fer-
tilization. 
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development,5 and determining the biochemistry of the brain.6 Each of 
these activities has created new risks of harm which could arise out of 
the new knowledge itself (or its misapplication)/ or from the carrying 
out of an experiment. As a result of the original research on recombi-
nant DNA, there arose an awareness of these new risks which impose 
the possibility of physical injury to the public at large. This awareness 
gave rise to the government's first real attempt to control scientific 
experimentation.8 
5. See notes 200-13 and accompanying text infra. 
6. Science is just beginning to understand the biological system known as the 
human mind. The interaction of billions of neuron cells as well as innumerable hormones is 
the most complex entity man has considered. See generally R. RESTACK, THE BRAIN, THE 
LAST FRONTIER (1979); P. RUSSELL, THE BRAIN BOOK (1979). Legal issues are beginning to 
arise because, as knowledge increases, so does the ability to manipulate the mind. As an 
alternative to our present penal system, one sociologist proposes to make use of advances 
in knowledge of the human mind: 
It might be possible to trace priority structures in the brain and selectively erase 
or replace inappropriate priorities in much the same manner that one edits a com-
puter program by erasing unneeded subprograms and routines. Although one effect 
would be some memory loss, a totally different feeling and priority structure and 
concomitant personality change could be achieved. It also could be possible to edit 
memory structures selectively and arrange either short- or long-term memory loss 
without disabling consequences. 
Techniques of brain editing are potentially the most effective means of in-
capacitating known offenders from committing future crimes. 
Lehtinen, Controlling the Minds and Bodies of Prisoners- Without Prisons, BARRISTER, 
Fall, 1979, at 13. 
7. Some states made the judgment that the study of Darwin's theory of evolution 
was dangerous to the school children of the state and passed laws to preclude the 
teaching of this concept. In Tennessee, this resulted in the infamous Scopes Monkey Trial. 
See Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927). The United States Supreme 
Court overturned similar legislation in Arkansas. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 
(1968). 
8. On September 21, 1973, Science published a letter signed by Maxine Singer and 
Dieter Soli addressed to the presidents of the National Academy of Sciences and the 
Academy's Institute of Medicine. The letter read in part as follows: 
We are writing to you, on behalf of a number of scientists, to communicate a mat-
ter of deep concern. Several of the scientific reports presented at this year's Gor-
don Research Conference on Nucleic Acids .•• indicated that we have the technical 
ability to join together ... DNA molecules from diverse sources .•.. 
Certain such hybrid molecules may prove hazardous to laboratory workers and to 
the public. Although no hazard has yet been established, prudence suggests that 
the potential hazard be seriously considered. 
Singer & Soli, Guidelines for DNA Hybrid Molecules, 181 SCIENCE 1114 (1973). 
In 1974,. scientists engaged in recombinant DNA research called for a voluntary 
moratorium on certain experiments, and outlined guidelines to control such research. Letter 
from Berg, et al., 185 SCIENCE 303 (1974). After further debate and meetings, the National 
Institute of Health (NIH) released a set of guidelines in June, 1976. National Institutes of 
Health, Recombinant DNA Research, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,911 (1976). For proposed 
revised guidelines, see 43 Fed. Reg. 33,042 (1978). 
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Counterbalancing this new desire to control science, are several 
equally important societal interests. Society has a long-standing inter-
est in the acquisition of scientific knowledge and the free flow of such 
information,9 as well as the preservation of the maximum number of 
choices for an individuaJ.l° Finally, the development of new technology 
is dependent upon unrestrained scientific inquiry, and without continu· 
ing technological growth, development within the areas of health care, 
employment, business, and defense will stagnate. These above policies, 
considered within the framework of our constitutional system, support a 
strong argument for a constitutional right of scientific inquiry. 
During the past decade there have been several instances in which 
the government has imposed restraints upon scientific inquiry 11 
without giving full consideration to the existence of such a right. The 
existence of a right would place substantial limitations upon govern-
mental activity, and must be considered before any meaningful scheme 
of regulation can be adopted. It is the purpose of this article to lay the 
foundation by proposing that there exists a constitutional right of 
scientific inquiry. It will be shown that such an activity can be pro-
tected as speech or a necessary incident to speech under the first 
amendment, or as an unique freedom entitled to protection as a fun-
damental right similar to the right of privacy or the right to travel. 
Before undertaking the constitutional analysis, this article will set 
forth a legal definition of the term scientific inquiry .12 Such a definition 
is necessary in order to predict which activities fall within the scope of 
the protected right.13 In formulating this definition, the nature of 
science and the complexity of the scientific process will first be ex-
amined. From this analysis the essential elements of the process will 
be gleaned and used to derive a suitable legal definition. 
Having established the legal definition of science and the scope of 
the right of scientific inquiry, this article will discuss the judicial 
standards for review. It is at this stage that the crucial balance be-
9. See notes 71-79 and accompanying text infra. 
10. As one author has noted, this freedom is particularly important to the scientist: 
The freedom to choose his own problem is the scientist's most precious posses-
sion. At the cutting edge of science, on the frontiers of knowledge, nature confronts 
the scientist with a tangled obscurity which he can hope to penetrate only occa-
sionally and with the most intense and dedicated effort. This kind of effort comes of 
devotion born of free choice, and scientists have therefore resisted external 
restraints and blandishments. 
B. COMMONER, SCIENCE AND SURVIVAL 49 (1966). 
11. Examples would include recombinant DNA research, fetal research, and human 
experimentation. 
12. Prior commentators in this area have failed to articulate such a definition. See, 
e.g., note 49 infra. 
13. This is not to say that other human activities such as inventing or economics 
might not also be entitled to constitutional protection. 
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tween the competing societal interests must be struck. Such difficult 
problems as national defense/4 human experimentation/5 fetal 
research/6 and recombinant DNA research17 will be considered as ex-
amples. 
II. THE NATURE OF SCIENCE 
The following is a primer for the non-scientist, an introduction to 
the process by which science develops new ideas and concepts. This 
discussion is important to sensitize the reader to the complexity and 
the fundamental nature of the scientific process. Before a legal defini-
tion of scientific inquiry or a discussion of the related constitutional 
right can be meaningful, some grasp of the process from the scientist's 
viewpoint is essential. 
A. The Scientist's Definition 
While it is possible to give short definitions of science, it is difficult 
for the non-scientist to gain significant insight into the process of 
scientific inquiry from them. Nevertheless, such definitions will pro-
vide a useful starting point for discussion. 
Dr. Joshua Lederberg, a Nobel laureate, has suggested the following 
definition: 
The profession of science is the search for truths about the natural 
world; more precisely, it seeks verifiable generalizations that simplify 
human comprehension and prediction of natural phenomena. Still more 
must be said: the truths must be novel and significant-which is to 
suggest that they are measured according to their impact on the minds 
of other scientists, a statement which labels science firmly as a human 
and social enterprise.18 
It should be noted that when Dr. Lederberg uses the word "truth" it 
does not denote a good or bad quality but a scientific "truth"; i.e., that 
which is subject to empirical verification. 
In his book, The New Priesthood, Ralph E. Lapp describes science 
slightly differently: 
The goals of science focus upon the exploration of the unknown and the 
enlargement of knowledge. Very often the greatest discoveries come 
when a man sees relationships between things which no one recognized 
before-or sees these in a new light. But usually science expands into 
14. See notes 149-57 and accompanying text infra. 
15. See notes 187-93 and accompanying text infra. 
16. See notes 200-13 and accompanying text infra. 
17. See notes 220-29 and accompanying text infra. 
18. Lederberg, The Freedoms and the Control of Science, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 596, 599 
(1972). Dr. Lederberg received the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1958. 
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the unknown like a hugh amoeba, moving first this way and then that, 
seeking the virgin and the fertile. Its goals are determined by oppor-
tunity and chance, and sometimes design.19 
655 
Finally, J. Bronowski, arguing that science at its highest level is an 
extremely creative human process, has offered the following definition: 
All science is the search for unity in hidden likenesses .... 
The scientist looks for order in the appearances of nature by explor-
ing such likenesses . . . . 
The progress of science is the discovery at each step of a new order 
which gives unity to what had long seemed unlike. Faraday did this 
when he closed the link between electricity and magnetism. Clark Max-
well did it when he linked both with light. Einstein linked time with 
space, mass with energy, and the path of light past the sun with the 
flight of a bullet ... :};() 
As can be seen in the above definitions, science is the search for 
knowledge of how and why the universe around us functions.21 The pro-
cess by which this knowledge is acquired is as complex as, and indeed 
might be considered parallel to, the development of the human mind. 
At times the process involves merely mechanical data gathering or 
tedious computation, but, like art, it is also a creative process in which 
the scientist, like the artist, seeks to provide some new insight or a dif-
ferent, broader, perspective of nature.22 
In addition, science is a social activity .23 The growth of scientific 
knowledge is heavily dependent upon the interchange of ideas among 
scientists, both contemporaries and predecessors. The scientist who 
makes a "breakthrough" not only "stands on the shoulders of giants, 
and hence can see a little farther," but he perceives reality subject to 
all of the strengths and weaknesses of this colleagues.24 
B. The Parallel Between Human Development and Scientific Growth 
In many ways, the process by which scientific knowledge has ad-
vanced over the centuries is similar to the process by which each in-
19. R. LAPP, THE NEW PRIESTHOOD 1-2 (1965) [hereinafter cited as LAPP]. 
20. J. BRONOWSKI, SCIENCE AND HUMAN VALUES 13-15 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 
HUMAN VALUES]. 
21. See J. BRONOWSKI, THE ORIGINS OF KNOWLEDGE AND IMAGINATION (1978) 
[hereinafter cited as ORIGINS OF KNOWLEDGE]; T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTION (1969) [hereinafter cited as KUHN]. 
22. HUMAN VALUES, supra note 20, at 3-20. 
23. Zimar, What is Science? in PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
11-12 (A. Michalos ed. 1974). 
24. It has been suggested that while Robinson Crusoe might have engaged in 
religious and technological activities, he could not have engaged in scientific and/or legal 
activities without fellow humans available to take part. Id. at 12; see also ORIGINS OF 
KNOWLEDGE, ~upra note 21, at 122-38. 
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dividual human being assimilates information to produce a working 
model of the world around him. It is a process that begins at birth and 
continues until death.2.5 
Consider the newborn infant. While his state of self-awareness is 
non-existent, the pain of hunger is real and it is only eliminated with 
the consumption of a liquid provided from a source that will soon be 
labeled "mommy." The infant knows nothing about the milk itself, but 
does enjoy the social contact of the feeding and prefers a stomach full 
rather than empty. At this stage, the infant's knowledge approximates 
the level of science that existed prior to the formation of civilizations 
or societies. It receives sensory data and instinctively does that which 
is necessary for survival, but does not know, and is incapable of asking, 
why things are the way they are. 
Within a few months, the child begins to eat a diversity of foods. 
This increase in sensory data results in different classifications or 
categories of food. Even though these first distinctions may not be ver-
balized, anyone who has observed a young child recognizes the func-
tioning of the categories in the acceptance and rejection of different 
foods or the same foods under different conditions. Foods may be 
sweet, sour, salty, spicy, hot, or cold. Additionally, they can be 
categorized by physical state-liquid, solid, or lumpy. The child will ac-
cept food in one state, but not another. Still, the child does not under-
stand the real source or function of food. As with science, classification 
of observable data into various categories is the first step in the pro-
cess of knowledge.26 As a child develops, visual data provides a new 
perspective of foods. The child observes that the parent is not the 
source of food. Rather the refrigerator, the cabinet, or even the super-
market is believed to be the source. Food is thus seen in a broader con-
text. 
Within a year or two the child begins to develop a powerful tool 
that will aid in his understanding of food: the tool of communication. 
25. Since the mind of the scientist is the ultimate source of scientific knowledge, a 
study of the development of science as a human endeavor is inextricably intertwined with 
the capabilities of the human mind. Thus, to understand the capabilities and maturation of 
the individual is to understand the process of science. 
26. Aristotle's physics started not from theory or definitions, but from observations 
of the distinctions between products of nature and products of art. F. WooDBRIDGE, 
ARISTOTLE'S VISION OF NATURE 65 (1965) (hereinafter cited as WOODBRIDGE]. See generally 
W. DURANT, THE LIFE OF GREECE 134-41, 526-31 (1939). For example, Aristotle believed 
that the different kinds of matter could be distinguished by their different observable 
physical properties. All things were composed of four basic elements or combinations 
thereof: earth possessed the properties of cold plus dryness, water combined cold with 
dampness, air possessed heat plus dampness, and fire combined heat with dryness. R. 
STEARNS, SCIENCE IN THE BRITISH COLONIES OF AMERICA 9 (1970) (hereinafter cited as 
STEARNS]. 
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This is the first and foremost tool of science or any other human in-
stitution and, indeed, the beginning of an organized society can be traced 
to the increasing ability of its individuals to communicate.27 Com-
munication allows the individual, child or scientist, to learn what 
others have observed, multiplying many times the raw data from 
which knowledge will grow. It must be understood that all knowledge 
is limited by the availability of data. The· farmer's child has observed 
the seeds and plants that produce vegetables, whereas the urban child 
does not have that opportunity, and cannot possess this data unless it 
is obtained by communication with parents, through books, or via 
television. Having acquired this new knowledge, the child's 
understanding of the source of his food also changes. He no longer 
perceives as the source his parents or the refrigerator, but learns that 
food comes plants and animals.28 
The next step that the child may take is of particular importance in 
the analogy to science. As described above in Bronowski's definition, it 
is the finding of likeness in that which was previously believed 
dissimilar. The urban/suburban child in America has two sets of obser-
vations which, at least initially, are not tied together. An example of 
the first is the awareness of beef being part of his family's normal diet. 
The second is an awareness of a cow as a farm animal, that she has big 
brown eyes and says "moo." These observations may co-exist within 
the child's mind for a period of time, but at some point the child will 
realize that the same cows that he or she admired in pleasant pastoral 
settings are killed and consumed by humans.29 Those facts which had 
co-existed separately were found to be related. The same process is 
very important to the growth of science. It took an Einstein to see the 
common denominator between energy and mass, both of which were 
27. See R. LEAKEY & R. LEWIS, ORIGINS 178-206 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ORIGINS]. 
28. History suggests that early scientific data gathering was similarly limited. Early 
fact gathering was usually a random process that resulted in a pool of facts containing 
data from (1) casual observation, (2) wide experiments, and (3) established crafts such as 
medicine or metallurgy. For example, Bacon's writings are typical of this early approach 
in that they contain observations which are inconsistent or lacking sufficient detail. See 
KUHN, supra note 21, at 15-16. 
Science in Colonial America operated at about the same level as the typical child. During 
this time scientists pursued three broad objectives: the collection of data, classification of 
data, and nomenclature. Few if any experiments as we know them today were carried out. 
STEARNS, supra note 26, at 6-8. 
29. Santa Claus is another classic example of a child's realization or analysis of con-
flicting coexistent facts. This is slightly different from the cow example because of the 
strong cultural position that promoted belief in Santa Claus. Nevertheless, at some point 
in time the facts overcome the myth. 
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well known to scientists prior to Einstein's realization of the interrela-
tionship.30 
As the child develops further, those categories by which food had 
previously been classified are no longer sufficient to satisfy the child's 
intellectual curiosity. For while these classifications describe the 
physical characteristics of food, they do not help to explain what food 
does in the body or to determine why some foods might be more 
beneficial for consumption than others. The questions why and how 
now become important. Through information gathered from parents, 
contemporaries, or teachers, the child learns of the components of food: 
calories, proteins, carbohydrates, vitamins, and minerals. 
By adding this new method of food classification to his working in-
formation, the child is capable of making more knowledgeable decisions 
as to what foods his body needs. Likewise, science often finds existing 
systems of classification inadequate when faced with new information. 
The new information does not discredit the previous classification, 
rather it demands that an additional system be created to take the 
new knowledge into account. When scientists first dealt with air pollu-
tion from a smoke stack, they determined the degree of pollution by 
opacity. As knowledge of pollutants became more sophisticated, it 
became apparent that other emissions could not be categorized by 
opacity and additional criteria had to be developed.31 
At this point in the child's development he must move beyond his 
day-to-day experiences to acquire more knowledge about food and its 
relationship to human existence. He must actively seek detailed 
knowledge about this particular topic. This level of understanding 
represents what must be the vast majority of human effort in the 
scientific process: the refining of existing ideas, the seeking of better 
and more data while working within existing scientific theories and 
paradigms.32 The student will learn that a calorie represents energy 
potential which is stored in the fat cells of the human body. He will 
30. This relationship as finally articulated by Einstein is expressed by the equation 
E = me•. See RELATIVITY THEORY: ITS ORIGINS AND IMPACT ON MODERN THOUGHT 85 (L. 
Williams ed. 1968). 
31. The residue of the old approach can be found in most state air pollution laws or 
regulations. For example, the Michigan Air Pollution Control Commission prohibits any 
emission of a density darker than No. 1.0 of the Ringelmann chart or not more than 200fo 
opacity. This rule is very seldom used because of the difficulty of proving a violation. Today in-
dustrial smoke emissions are considered under the general categories of particulate matter, 
sulfur oxides, carbon monoxide, ozones, hydrocarbons, nitrogen dioxide, and lead, and are 
measured by concentration in the air not opacity. 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.1-.12 (1980). 
32. Paradigms are accepted models or examples of actual scientific practice. They in-
clude law, theory, application, and instrumentation. "Copernican astronomy," "Newtonian 
mechanics," or "wave optics" are examples of paradigms. KUHN, supra note 21, at 10-11, 
187-91. 
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discover that proteins are constructed from building blocks called 
amino acids, and that amino acids are built in accordance with the 
specifications of DNA molecules found in the genes of different life 
forms. 
The student's ability to gain this knowledge is a function of com-
munication with those who have spent a lifetime seeking information 
and of the growth of the underlying technological support that allows 
better and more sophisticated data to be gathered. The various scien-
tific fields interrelate; for example, the ability of the biologist was 
limited by the development of knowledge in the field of optics. Thus, 
until physicists advanced the understanding of light and optics, the 
equipment available to the biologist was limited.33 
The final step that our student will take is not to acquire a more 
detailed knowledge of food, but to set it in a broader perspective: to 
see how food relates to other human and natural activities. It is im-
possible to predict which individuals will be able to go on to this next 
step in the process. It does not appear to be a function of intelligence 
but of creativity .34 While it is relatively easy to understand and 
observe the connection between lack of food and malnutrition, it is 
more difficult to perceive the relationship between a bushel of wheat 
and a barrel of oil. Few understand food in the context of human 
economics and the power of the free market to allocate more in terms 
of money and less in terms of need. Fewer still see food as a resource 
allocation of land and energy which is done consciously by government 
planning or unconsciously through the free market economy.35 
Consider for a moment the vast change in the state of knowledge 
that our example child has realized over a twenty-five to thirty year 
period. Thirty years ago some of these concepts would not have been 
realized by even the most perceptive of individuals. Thirty years from 
now much of what is presently in the forefront of knowledge will be 
proven correct or merely the starting point for future insight. For if 
the process of science is anything, it is change: seeking out the new, 
discarding the outmoded, constantly looking for an ultimate, complete 
view of the universe which may never be attained. 
33. The Dutch appear to have been the first to combine the convex and concave 
lenses in the late part of the 16th Century. Soon thereafter the instruments were 
developed to resolve 1.4 microns at 270 magnification. In modern times the versatility of 
the microscope has been greatly expanded by using electron beams (at a resolution of 
IOOA 0 a magnification of 50,000 is routine), x-rays, and ultrasound. T. RocHow & E. 
ROCHOW, AN INTRODUCTION TO MICROSCOPY BY MEANS OF LIGHT, ELECTRONS, X·RAYS OR 
ULTRASOUND (1978). 
34. See generally M. POLONYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION 55-92 (1966); Greenberg, Eim-
tein: The Gourmet of Creativity, 115 SCI. NEws 216 (1979). 
35. For a discussion of this topic, see L. BROWN, THE TWENTY NINTH DAY 128-60 
(1978). 
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Take, for example, the fundamental issue of what are the elemental 
building blocks of the physical world. The first clear articulation of an 
atomic theory, before that term was created, was by Aristotle. While 
reflecting many of the ideas of the Egyptians and Indians, he stated 
that the physical world was composed of a mixture of four basic 
elements: air, fire, earth, and water. Additionally, these elements could 
be found in four states of being: hot, wet, dry, and cold.36 This theory 
represented an attempt by some of the most gifted intellects of Greece 
to explain the basic structure of the physical universe. Artistotle's 
theory was arrived at with little, if any, scientific experimentation as 
we know it. As with the first steps of the child in the prior example, 
he merely observed the world around him with his five senses, and 
then tried to provide some rational explanation and categorization for 
the phenomena which he observed.37 
Aristotle's conception of the basic elements passed on through the 
centuries by the alchemists and pharmacists of medieval times. This 
complete paradigm remained largely unchallenged until the latter half 
of the 1700's. During this period a few researchers, using more 
sophisticted apparatus, were experimenting with air and various gases. 
There developed quickly a realization that air was not ~he same 
everywhere: bottles of gases derived from different sources had dif-
ferent properties (sustain the breathing of a canary, support a flame, 
have different weights, etc.). This provided the first crack in the 
Aristotle paradigm. 38 
This step is analogous to the child gathering new information that 
makes old series of categories seem inappropriate. The men of the 
1700's were able to do this because the developments in primitive 
technology allowed a great increase in the type of data gathered by 
the human senses.39 Note also that these men were among the first to 
develop a scientific method for gathering data,40 and, thus, set the in-
tellectual stage for Lavoisier to make his scientific breakthrough which 
would destroy the Artistotelian paradigm of matter. 
36. Read, Chemistry, in WHAT IS SCIENCE? 154-55 (J. Newman ed. 1955) [hereinafter 
cited as Read]. 
37. See WOODBRIDGE, supra note 26, at 65. 
38. Read, supra note 36, at 157-65. 
39. As Read states, modern chemistry owes its birth to the use of the balance and 
other instruments of precision that allowed the chemist to observe chemical changes quan-
titatively. Id. at 164. For a discussion of how the development of technology is a critical 
part of the advance of science, see Asimov, Pure and Impure: The Interplay of Science 
and Technology, SAT. REV., June 9, 1979, at 23. 
40. For a full enumeration of the elements of scientific method, see text accompanying 
notes 56-57 infra, 
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Now, as so often in the history of science, a point had been reached 
at which the known facts enabled a tremedous step forward to be 
taken. The only remaining obstacle was a mental one; for one of the 
most difficult of all mental processes is to reassemble a series of 
familiar facts and relationships and to regard them from a new view-
point. 
In this ability lay the great genius of Lavoisier, who, without making a 
single discovery of any new body, or property, or natural phenomenon, 
demolished in the 1780s the barrier that had hitherto blocked progress 
in chemistry.41 
661 
In his mind he rejected the previous paradigm and found that there 
were elements more fundamental than air, water, and solid; that, in 
fact, these new fundamental elements could be forced to go from one 
physical state to another42 (ie., oxygen may be a pure gas, or combined 
with hydrogen to form water or with other chemicals such as iron to 
form solids). Thus, there arose a new paradigm around the concept of 
atomic theory. According to this theory, atoms were the building 
blocks of the universe. The atom was pictured as a "hard, im-
penetrable, movable particle . . . so very hard as never to wear or 
break in pieces .... "43 This picture corresponded with the best informa-
tion available at that time. However, science never stops inquiring and, 
with more observation and better equipment, new ideas again come to 
the forefront. 
In 1898, J.J. Thomson discovered the particle known as the electron 
and thus destroyed the picture ofthe impenetrable atom. Subsequently, 
the atom was found to consist of three different particles: the electron, 
proton, and neutron.44 Since the development of this model of the atom 
there have been additional discoveries of particles but the search has 
moved out of the realm of chemistry and into the world of high energy 
physics. These developments in turn produced continued evolution and 
refinements of the concepts contained within the atomic theory. If 
science were not open ended and uncontrolled, the new ideas that 
spurred further development would have been stifled.45 
41. Read, supra note 36, at 165. 
42. I d. at 166-68. 
43. This was the view of Newton. /d. at 167. 
44. Id. at 170-75. 
45. A prime example of how outside control of science can stifle its growth is found 
in the Lysenko affair in the Soviet Union. Lysenko, a self-educated agronomist who pro-
duced several ideas that helped the collective farms of the Soviet Union, had gained the 
political support of Stalin around 1935. With this support came an attack by Lysenko on 
Soviet geneticists. He believed that all characteristics were acquired by inheritance, and 
that genes played no part in the development process. Lysenko believed that the heredity 
characteristics of a living organism were determined by the external environmental condi-
HeinOnline -- 19 Duq. L. Rev. 662 1980-1981
662 Duquesne Law Review Vol.19:651 
The preceeding has been a non-scientist's introduction, not so much 
to the substance of science, as the process of science. The process of 
doing science is the focal point for the remainder of this article. It is 
the process of science and scientific inquiry, as well as the substance of 
science, with which society through the legal system must deal. 
C. Science and the Law-Definition of Science 
Before any meaningful legal analysis of the basis for a constitutional 
right of scientific inquiry can be pursued, a workable legal definition of 
scientific inquiry must be formulated. This definition would allow some 
measure of predictability in the selection of activities to receive con-
stitutional protection-without the constant use of litigation to classify 
each activity case by case.46 
While almost everyone may have a general sense of what science is, 
such vague definition is not very helpful. Similarly, the previous defini-
tions suggested by scientists and philosophers of science cannot be used 
since they are imprecise in their attempts to distinguish between pro-
tected and unprotected activities.47 For example, which of the following 
activities are scientific inquiry: A group of college physics students at-
tempting to build an atomic bomb, the basement biologist trying to 
tions of many generations and that each alteration of conditions led to a change in heredi-
ty. The culmination of the genetics controversy came in 1948 when Stalin banned research 
and teaching in standard genetics and permitted Lysenko to mandate changes in school 
curriculum and research programs. 
Many reasons for the suppression have been given. For example, the genetics theorists 
of his time were generally from the bourgeois families, and had been educated abroad. 
Thus, it took only a little effort for the communist party to convert the geneticists' 
disinterest in agriculture into a purposeful wrecking of the new economy, or their interest 
in eugenics into sympathy with facist theories of racism. Others have stated that Stalin's 
support for Lysenko arose from his desire to build a new Soviet man. It was theorized 
that if the characteristics acquired in a man's lifetime can be inherited, then a unique 
Soviet individual would emerge all the more quickly. 
After 1948, in spite of constant attacks by modern geneticists, Lysenko maintained 
his power through personal friendship with Stalin and, later, Khrushchev. With each attack, 
Lysenko proposed other grandiose agricultural projects in order to boost his political 
stock. It was not until 1964 with the fall of Khrushchev that Lysenko was finally 
discredited and modern genetics was reborn in the Soviet Union. L. GRAHAM, SCIENCE AND 
PHILOSOPHY IN THE SOVIET UNION 195-256 (1972); D. JORAVSKY, THE LYSENKO AFFAm (1970); 
Z. MEDVEDEV, THE RISE AND FALL OF T.D. LYSENKO (1969). 
46. A failure to classify the conduct as protected could lead to hopeless confusion. A 
classic example of this problem has occurred in obscenity cases. Without an adequate 
definition of obscenity or pornography, the Supreme Court has been faced with an endless 
procession of cases in which it has attempted to classify activities as protected or un-
protected under the first amendment on a piecemeal basis. See L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 656-70 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE]. 
47. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra. 
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create life by randomly combining organic chemicals, the engineer who 
must design an engine component for the NASA space shuttle, the pro-
fessor trying to determine the chemical reaction which takes place during 
photosynthesis, the corporate scientist who works to understand the 
fundamental process by which sunlight can be directly converted to 
electrical energy, or the professor of sociology taking a random on-the-
street survey of views on marriage and divorce? 
There are a number of possible approaches to legally defining a 
term. One could break down the process of scientific inquiry into its 
component parts; e.g., thinking, analyzing, observing, experimenting, 
communicating, writing reports, publishing, receiving information, ad-
vocating positions, disseminating information, and collecting data. Each 
component is analyzed independently48 to determine whether it 
deserves constitutaional protection. If the activity is made up solely of 
traditional first amendment components, then a fortiori it is protected. 
If traditional first amendment analysis shows the activity is composed 
of both protected and unprotected parts, then the activity is entitled 
to protection if a preponderance of the components are protected.49 
The advantage of this approach is that the definition is framed in 
terms of familiar concepts; e.g., thought, communication, etc. Addi-
tionally, its application in individual cases is relatively simple and 
straightforward. There is a significant disadvantage, however, in 
breaking scientific inquiry into component parts, because what results 
48. This procedure has been adopted in formulating a legal definition of death. Life 
can be broken down into many of its component activities; e.g., breathing, talking, thinking, 
heartbeat, etc. Death is then defined in terms of the absence of one or more activities; for 
example, unresponsiveness to normally painful stimuli, absense of spontaneous breathing, 
a flat EKG; i.e., absence of heart spontaneous brain functions. See Commonwealth v. 
Golston, 373 Mass. 883, 336 N.E. 2d 744 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978) 
49. Delgado and Millen employ this approach in their article which proposes a right 
of scientific inquiry: 
The precise components of a given scientific investigation will vary depending on 
the discipline, the problem under study, and the researcher's choice of 
methodology. In general, however, the process will include many of the following 
elements: thinking, consulting with colleagues, experimentation, publishing results, 
and teaching. The process is a continuous cycle; it can be interrupted by in· 
terference with any of the component activities. New ideas and theories are often 
sparked by experimentation or by discussion of the research results of colleagues. 
The testing of one hypothesis may unexpectedly produce evidence suggesting a 
completely different theory or casting doubt on an established principle. Because of 
this interconnectedness, each stage of the process must be protected if the entire 
enterprise is to be protected. Conversely, if each step in the process is protected, 
the whole must be protected as well. 
Delgado & Millen, God, Galileo, and Government: Toward Constitutional Protection For 
Scientific Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REV. 349, 371 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Delgado & Millen) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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is a list of activities thay may encompass more than the "scientific in-
quiry" that was originally intended to be protected. For example, the 
components thinking, analyzing, observing, etc., would also encompass 
the activities of lawyers, economists, and historians.50 
This approach does not take cognizance of the uniqueness of scien-
tific inquiry or the complex problems associated with its regulation.51 
Frequently the focal point of governmental concern will be the ex-
perimental components of scientific inquiry. It is this step in the pro-
cess which is most difficult to incorporate into traditional categories of 
analysis, but may nevertheless receive protection if a preponderence of 
other components are protected. The ultimate effect of this approach is 
to de-emphasize that component which should be the focus of the 
analysis. 
A better approach allows for the recognition of scientific inquiry as 
a unique process and a spectrum spanning from purely theoretical 
work to scientific experimentation. Because of the complex variety of 
such situations, the development of a precise definition to help draw 
the lines of distinction is difficult.52 Nevertheless, the following test 
should be sufficiently succinct to enable one to distinguish scientific in-
quiry from other activities. For an activity to fall within the definition 
of "scientific inquiry" it must (1) have as its primary but not sole 
motivation, the acquisition of knowledge which will lead to additional 
understanding of the natural universe, allow new explanations of 
natural phenomena, and result in the ability to make predictions con-
cerning the organic laws of the natural universe; and, (2) be carried out 
in accordance with the accepted scientific method appropriate to the 
nature of the activity. 
The inquiry will be considered to be primarily motivated toward the 
goal of the acquisition of knowledge if it is 
50. This is not to suggest, however, that these activitiel[l should not be protected 
under the first amendment; merely that they do not qualify as scientific inquiry. 
51. Based on this approach, all the factual examples discussed in the text could be 
classified as protected. All of those activities include thinking, analyzing, collecting data, 
and observing. In addition, the college professor, the industrial researcher, and the NASA 
engineer will, to a greater or lesser degree, engage in experimenting, communicating, 
writing reports, and publishing and, therefore, would be protected under the component 
approach. 
52. Two prior articles that address the issue of the constitutional right of scientific 
inquiry did not develop a workable definition. In passing, Robertson states that "research 
is taken generally to encompass all activities and procedures designed to generate new 
knowledge . . • ." Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research: A Constitutional 
Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Robertson]. Delgado 
and Millen suggest that "'Basic research' has been defined as 'original investigations for 
the advancement of scientific knowledge ... which do not have specific [practical] objec-
tives or ends in view."' Delgado & Millen, supra note 49, at 352 n.21 (quoting NATIONAL 
SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE INDICATORS 53 (1975)). 
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(a) theoretical in nature, and involves the use of one's intellect and 
communicative ability to develop existing theories, law, or 
paradigms, or to formulate new theories, laws, or paradigms 
concerning the natural universe; 
(b) experimentation which seeks data to verify existing theories, 
laws, or paradigms concerning the natural universe; or 
(c) experimentation which seeks data from which new theories, 
laws, or paradigms can be formulated concerning the natural 
universe. 
665 
The term experimentation in the above definition is used in its 
broadest sense. It is intended to include the passive observation of 
naturally occurring phenomena as well as the collection of data obtained 
under controlled conditions produced by human instigation. 
The definition of scientific inquiry requires that the inquiry be 
focused on the operation of the natural universe. Clearly included 
within the scope of this term is the subject matter of the basic 
disciplines chemistry, physics, biology, and astronomy,53 since they are 
governed by laws which cannot be created by human intervention. 
These "organic" laws exist independently of human discovery and 
postulization, and are in theory the ultimate goal of scientific inquiry. 
One the other hand, pursuits such as law, economics, and political 
science would not be included in scientific inquiry since they concern 
themselves with man's relationship with man rather than man's rela-
tionship with the natural universe. These disciplines are governed by 
laws which can be created and changed by human intervention. Finally, 
those disciplines referred to as the social sciences would be included to 
the extent that they are concerned with organic rather than human 
law. 
It should be noted that not all experimentation is to be included 
within the definition of scientific inquiry. Quite often experiments are 
undertaken for purposes other than to verify existing theories, laws, 
or paradigms; for example, educational experiments which seek to 
demonstrate rather than verify, would not be included.54 Additionally, 
53. Astronomy is the observation and accumulation of data concerning the history 
and physical laws of the large bodies of the universe. Another major area of science is 
physics which "concerns itself with matter and energy in all their general manifestations." 
E. Condon, Physics, in WHAT IS SCIENCE 102 (J. Newman ed. 1955). Chemistry is concerned 
with the properties of matter such as its structure, composition, and susceptibility to 
change. Finally, there is the broad category of biology which may be considered as the 
study, classification, and interaction of living organisms. See generally WHAT IS SCIENCE 
(J. Newman ed. 1955). 
54. The classic example is the dissecting of frogs in biology class. Killing frogs does 
not result in any additional understanding of the natural universe. While a particular stu· 
dent may gain personal knowledge, society has gained no additional information. This ac· 
tivity therefore cannot be protected as scientific inquiry. 
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testing procedures, although sometimes referred to as experiments, 
would not be included. The purpose of testing is to acquire data which 
can be used as a basis for decisions concerning the environment, 
health, economics, or other areas of human interest. For example, a 
series of chemical and biological tests on a particular stream to deter-
mine if the standards in the Federal Clean Water Act55 are being met 
would not constitute scientific experiment-even though the tests 
were carried out using scientific methodology. 
Although an activity qualifies under the first part of the test, it may 
still fall short of being classified as scientific inquiry unless it is car-
ried out in accordance with accepted scientific method.56 An activity 
will be considered to employ the scientific method if it 
(1) uses a suitable method for describing its subject matter; e.g., 
mathematics, words, diagrams, or symbols; 
(2) uses an existing method systematizing or classifying the 
material to be described, or creates a new method for doing so; e.g., 
classifying plants into species on the basis of particular features, or 
naming and classifying sub-atomic particles; 
(3) uses hypotheses for the purpose of predicting or accounting for 
the occurrence of natural phenomena; 
(4) uses experimentaton, as previously defined, to test hypotheses. 
Experimentation should include {a) planning objectives and procedures, 
{b) potential for recognizing error and minimizing it by proper design, 
{c) gathering data and insuring its uniformity, (d) analyzing the data, 
and interpreting the data and drawing conclusions based on the data.57 
55. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1567 (1977) (codified in scattered sections of 33 
U.S.C.). 
56. It is important to understand the fundamental purpose of using the scientific 
methodology. One author has suggested the following: 
The real purpose of scientific method is to make sure Nature hasn't misled you 
into thinking you know something you don't actually know. There's not a mechanic 
or scientist or technician alive who hasn't suffered from that one so much that he's 
not instinctively on guard. That's the main reason why so much scientific and 
mechanical information sounds so dull and so cautious. If you get careless or go 
romanticizing scientific information, giving it a flourish here and there, Nature will 
soon make a complete fool out of you. It does it often enough anyway even when 
you don't give it opportunities. One must be extremely careful and rigidly logical 
when dealing with Nature: one logical slip and an entire scientific edifice comes 
tumbling down. One false deduction about the machine and you can get hung up in-
definitely. 
R. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE 101 (1974) (hereinafter cited as 
PIRSIG]. 
57. See W. FOWLER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD (1962); E. NAGEL, THE 
STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE 1-13 (1961); 5 MCGRAW-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY 156 (1977); 12 MCGRAW-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 102 
(1977). The classic college science experiment has the student go through the following 
steps: "(1) statement of the problem, (2) hypotheses as to the cause of the problem, (3) ex-
periments designed to test each hypothesis, (4) predicted results of the experiments, 
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It should be recognized that the elements discussed need not co-exist 
before an activity will be considered to employ the scientific method. 
Theoretical work need only meet the first three requirements. Ex-
perimental work must satisfy the fourth as well. 
Based upon the above two-part test for scientific inquiry, only the 
chemistry professor and the corporate scientist would be engaged in 
scientific inquiry. The college students attempting to build an atomic 
bomb do not engage in scientific inquiry because their motivation is 
not to gain an additional explanation, understanding, or prediction of 
the natural universe. At the very best they are seeking to increase 
their personal knowledge. Their work could not be considered an at-
tempt to verify an existing theory or law, since it is merely an effort 
to reproduce present technology. 
While the basement biologist seeking to create life by randomly 
combining organic chemicals may have the goal of gaining an addi-
tional understanding of the natural universe, he is not carrying out his 
work according to the scientific method. In particular, he has no 
hypothesis on which to base his work. Furthermore, if his experimenta-
tion is unplanned or carried out using techniques which would not in-
sure uniformity and repeatability, it would not be considered to be using 
the scientific method. This is not to say that all efforts of amateur 
scientists are not scientific inquiry. It means only that their work must 
meet the full test. 
The space engineer who seeks to develop a new engine component 
for the NASA space shuttle does not engage in scientific inquiry 
because his primary goal is not to gain an additional understanding of 
the natural universe, but to develop a technology which will meet a 
particular design criteria. Although his work may in fact add to our 
understanding of the natural universe, it would be insufficient to qualify 
it for scientific inquiry. 
The professor who works at his university laboratory to determine 
the chemical reaction of photosynthesis does engage in scientific in-
quiry because his primary goal is to gain an understanding of a basic 
process underlying the conversion of sunlight to plant energy. This 
conclusion assumes that the professor employs the scientific method in 
the conduct of his work. 
The scientist who is employed by a private corporation to study the 
fundamental process by which sunlight can be directly converted into 
electrical energy would be engaging in scientific inquiry. This conclu-
sion presumes that the primary goal of the corporation in supporting 
this work is to gain an additional understanding of the laws governing 
(5) observed results of the experiments and (6) conclusions from the results of the experi-
ment." PIRSIG, supra note 56, at 100. 
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the process of direct energy conversion in certain materials. The fact 
that any useful knowledge developed from this work could lead to the 
development of a profitable product or technology would not disqualify 
the work from classification as scientific inquiry.58 The overriding pur-
pose of any business entity is to create a profit for its investors. A 
business entity, however, could sponsor some work so fundamental 
that it cannot be said to relate directly to any product. The ultimate 
test remains the same: if the primary goal is to gain knowledge which 
will lead to an additional understanding of the universe, it is scientific 
inquiry; if the prime motivation of the particular project is economic 
gain, then it does not qualify as scientific inquiry. 
Finally, the professor of sociology who conducts a survey on at-
titudes about marriage and divorce, perhaps to determine the cause of 
the increase in divorce rates, would not be engaging in scientific in-
quiry. His study seeks to gain an understanding of the changing rela-
tionships between man-made laws and human conduct. 
The purpose of the foregoing discussion has been to give as precisely 
as possible, a legal definition of scientific inquiry. Using this definition, 
one can differentiate those activities which may claim constitutional 
protection as scientific inquiry. 
Ill. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 
If scientific inquiry is to be recognized as a constitutionally pro-
tected right, the government's ability to impose restrictions and 
regulations will be severely limited. Faced with a constitutionally pro-
tected activity, the government has the burden of justifying any in-
terference. 59 Instead of requiring the scientist to overcome the 
presumption that laws and regulations are valid, the government must 
justify its intrusion under the appropriate constitutional test. 
A constitutional right of scientific inquiry p1ay be developed under 
58. This fact is well accepted within the scientific society. As reflective of this at-
titude, scientists at Bell Telephone Laboratories have received seven Nobel Prizes for 
research. 
Clinton Davisson shared the Nobel Prize in 1937 for demonstrating the wave 
nature of matter. In 1956, John Bardeen, Walter Brattain and William Shockley 
were honored for their invention of the transistor. Philip Anderson's theoretical 
work on amorphous materials (such as glass) and on magnetism led to a Nobel Prize 
in 1977. And in 1978, Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson received the Prize for detect-
ing the faint radiation from the "big bang" explosion that gave birth to the 
universe some 18 billion years ago. 
SCIENTIFIC AM., June 1979, at 5 (Bell Labs advertisement). 
59. For example, if a regulation attempts to abridge speech directly, it will be found 
unconstitutional unless the government shows that the message being suppressed poses a 
"clear and present danger," constitutes a defamatory falsehood, or is otherwise un-
protected. TRIBE, supra note 46, at 582. 
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either of two different approaches. The first finds its basis in the first 
amendment right to free speech.60 Under this approach a number of 
possible lines of analysis can be pursued. Scientific inquiry can be 
viewed as a single expressive activity; i.e., speech, and thus entitled to 
constitutional protection.61 Alternatively, one can recognize that cer-
tain activities carried out by the scientist are not communicative, but 
nevertheless must be protected as a necessary incident to the full ex-
ercise of the communicative aspects of science. Finally, scientific in-
quiry could be categorized as "speech plus." 
The second approach for the development of a right of scientific inquiry 
offers a broader basis for establishment of constitutional protection. 
Under this approach scientific inquiry, like the right of privacy or 
travel, would be recognized as a fundamental right found either within 
the structure of the Constitution or standing alone.62 
A. Scientific Inquiry as Speech or as a Necessary Incident of Speech 
1. Science as Pure Speech 
It has been suggested that scientific research is protected as pure 
speech under the first amendment.63 Scientific research is presumed to 
be predominantly expressive and, therefore, entitled to be protected in 
its entirety as speech. Many of the steps in the process make use of 
written or verbal expression; e.g., consulting with colleagues, 
publishing reports, teaching others in lectures, and interviewing the 
subject of an experiment. Since a majority of the individual com-
ponents of scientific inquiry are communicative, it is argued, the pro-
cess in its entirety must be protected. 
Other aspects of science are not directly involved with written or 
verbal communication. For example, an experiment in high-energy 
physics will involve months or even years of data gathering, computer 
programming, and analyzing results. The actual communication of the 
results of the work will occur over a short period of time and would 
normally involve publishing a paper or giving an oral presentation. 
Thus, while it is true that the normal communicative activities may 
numerically outweigh these other activities, in fact, a mtich larger pro-
portion of a scientist's time is spent on activities other than speaking 
or writing. Since these activities are not expressive in the normal 
60. "Congress shall make no law ..• abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press 
.... " U.S. CONST., amend. I. 
61. A hybrid of the above analysis has been suggested by Delgado. See Delgado and 
Millen, supra note 49, at 371. 
62. See notes 237-350 and accompanying text infra. 
63. Davidson, First Amendment Protection for Biomedical Research, 14 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 893, 896-907 (1977). 
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sense of the word, if they are to be protected, they would have to be 
classified as symbolic speech. 
In Spence v. Washington64 the Supreme Court suggested that two 
important elements were necessary for symbolic speech. First, the 
speaker must have an intention to convey a particular message and, 
second, in the environment of the activity in question, the message 
would be understood by those who were viewing it.65 
The weakness of considering scientific inquiry as pure speech 
becomes apparent when the test of symbolic speech is applied to ex-
perimentation. If a subjective standard is employed, it is unlikely that 
any communicative intent will be found. When the scientist conducts 
an experiment, he intends to acquire data-unlike a demonstrator who 
burns a draft card or displays a flag to communicate a concept or 
idea.68 Additionally, the requirement of an intent to communicate will 
not be satisfied when a particular researcher, by his own initiative or 
by government regulation, decides to keep his research secret. In prac-
tice, a requirement of intent to communicate depending upon the ex-
perimenter's state of mind would result in some work being protected 
and others not. Such a distinction would be entirely artificial and un-
workable in practice. Such a requirement could produce denial of con-
stitutional protection because a scientist about to carry out an experiment 
is unlikely to perceive it as a communicative activity. On the other 
hand, the requirement could be formally met by a simple one-sentence 
declaration that all work was intended to be communicative. 
It might be argued that an objective standard be used to determine 
the communicative intent of the experimenter. In such a case, the sur-
rounding circumstances would be used to infer an intent to com-
municate. When burning a draft card or displaying a flag is carried out 
before an audience, it is inferred that the person intends to com-
municate a message by his acts. However, experiments are rarely carried 
out before an audience; moreover, from the scientists's viewpoint, it 
would highly undesirable to do so, because of the need to control the 
surrounding circumstances. Even assuming that the experimenter's in-
tent would be to communicate a message, it is highly unlikely that 
anyone would receive his ideas or concepts from observing the activity.67 
64. 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam). In Spence the Court was called upon to deter-
mine the validity of a conviction based on a statute which made it a crime to publicly 
display an American flag to which a peace symbol had been attached. The Court reversed 
the conviction concluding that the petitioner's conduct was protected as symbolic speech 
under the first amendment. Id. at 415. 
65. Id. at 410-11. 
66. In Spence, displaying a flag with a peace symbol attached was alleged to be sym-
bolic speech. Id. at 405. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the petitioner 
claimed that burning his draft card was symbolic speech. Id. at 376. 
67. PmsiG, supra note 56, at 103. 
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The test developed in Spence was designed to deal with a single 
event of relatively short duration which was intended to be expressive. 
When this test is employed to evaluate experimentation, its applicability 
becomes questionable. The process of experimentation rarely involves 
a single event: much research is carried out over periods of months or 
even years. Considering experimentation as symbolic speech is like 
trying to place a triangular shape into a rectangular hole. Depending 
on the size used it may occasionally be forced in, but in no event is the 
result particularly satisfactory. 
The pure speech approach requires that some aspects of scientific 
inquiry such as experim.entation be classified as symbolic speech. 
While a logical argument can be made in support of such a position, it 
requires extending present concepts well beyond the current bound-
aries established by the Court. It is unlikely that the Court would be 
willing to so distort the symbolic speech concept. 
Even if the problems of fitting experimentation within the confines 
of symbolic speech are ignored, it is still very awkward and misleading 
to classify the entity of scientific inquiry as pure speech. The primary 
purpose of scientific inquiry is to advance the body of scientific 
knowledge.68 Although communication of ideas and data is important to 
this goal and to the long term development of science, it is improper to 
characterize the scientific process as basically expressive. Communica-
tion, either oral or written, is an important step in achieving the ends 
of science, but it is only one step. Observation, data gathering, ex- · 
perimentation, analysis, and conclusions are equally important means 
for achieving the ends of science-and such acts are not expressive as 
normally defined. 
2. Necessary Incident of Speech 
Under a second line of analysis, those components of scientific in-
quiry which are not clearly speech may be protected, nevertheless, as 
necessary incidents of speech. On a number of occasions the Supreme 
Court has found it necessary to protect certain non-communicative ac-
tivities in order to insure the most effective exercise of the right of 
free speech,69 thereby fully implementing the strong policies underly-
68. See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra. 
69. The following is a summary of the "incident" cases as gathered by Professor 
Tribe: 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (contributing money); Spence v. Washington, 418 
U.S. 405 (1974) (displaying flag with peace symbol attached); Cohen v. California, 
403 U.S. 15 (1971) (wearing sign on back of jacket); Schacht v. United States, 398 
U.S. 58 (1970) (wearing uniform); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969) (wearing black armbands); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) 
(demonstration); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (litigation); West Virginia 
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ing the first amendment.70 In order to determine if a specific activity is 
to be protected as a necessary incident, the Court must decide 
whether the activity is essential to the meaningful exercise of the 
right of free speech in light of the underlying policies. To ascertain 
whether the non-communicative aspects of scientific inquiry are 
necessary incidents, the policies underlying the first amendment will 
be examined. Then specific activities will be evaluated to determine 
their importance to the meaningful exercise of the communicative 
aspects of scientific inquiry. 
The policies and purposes of the first amendment have been variously 
described as promoting individual self-fulfillment, societal interests, 
and combinations thereof.71 The policy of self-fulfillment was first sug-
gested more than fifty years ago in Whitney v. California, 72 when 
Justice Brandeis stated, "Those who won our independence believed 
that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their 
faculties .... "73 The roots of this right of individual self-fulfillment go 
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory flag salute); Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (picketing); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 
(1931) (displaying red flag). 
TRmE, supra note 46, at 599 n.ll. 
70. Concerning these policies the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965), stated: 
[T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract 
the spectrum of available knowledge. The right of freedom of speech and press in-
cludes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right 
to receive, the right to read (Martin v. Struther, 319 U.S. 141, 143) and freedom of 
inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach (see Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 
U.S. 183, 195) indeed the freedom of the entire university community. Sweezy v. 
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249·50, 261-63; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 
109, 112; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 369. Without those peripheral rights the 
specific rights would be less secure. 
Id. at 482·83. 
71. Professor Emerson has suggested that: 
The values sought by society in protecting the right to freedom of expression 
may be grouped into four broad categories. Maintenance of a system of free expres-
sion is necessary (1) as a method of assuring individual self-fulfillment, (2) as a 
means of attaining the truth, (3) as a method of securing participation by the 
members of the society in social, including political, decision·making, and (4) as a 
means of maintaining the balance between stability and change in the society. 
T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FrnST AMENDMENT 1-5 (1963) [hereinafter 
cited as TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY]; see also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION 17-18 (1970); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERN· 
MENT (1948) [hereinafter cited as FREE SPEECH]; A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960) 
[hereinafter cited as POLITICAL FREEDOM]; TRIBE, supra note 46, at 576-79; Rehnquist, The 
First Amendment: Freedom, Philosophy, and the Law, 12 GoNz. L. REV. 1 (1976) [herein-
after cited as Rehnquist]. 
72. 274 u.s. 357 (1927). 
73. Id. at 375. This concept of individual self-fulfillment was recently referred to by 
the Supreme Court in Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972): "To permit the continued 
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much deeper than the first amendment. They are based on two widely 
accepted premises of Western thought: (1) that the proper end of man 
is the fulfillment of his character and potential as a human being, and 
(2) that an individual, as a member of society, is entitled to fair and 
equal treatment from the state.74 
What standard is to be used to measure the development of man's 
character and potential? It is man's extraordinary intellectual capacity 
which differentiates him from the rest of the animal kingdom.75 This in-
tellectual capacity consists of a unique ability to observe and under-
stand the functioning of the environment and man's relationship to it. 
Thus, in order for each individual to achieve fulfillment of his 
character and potential as a human being, it is necessary to fully exer-
cise and develop these intellectual abilities. The process of developing 
these abilities requires the acquisition of information from diverse 
sources and the formulation of ideas and actions based on this informa-
tion. 
This concept of self-fulfillment has been recognized in the United 
States from the very beginning. In the Declaration of Independence it 
is recognized that all men have certain inalienable rights including 
"life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," rights which represent the 
process by which one may obtain self-fulfillment.76 Further, the first 
amendment was to be the guarantee that this pursuit of self-fulfillment 
would not be interfered with by governmental action. If the first 
amendment is perceived as the vehicle for carrying individuals to their 
goal of self-fulfillment, then information and ideas are the fuel for the 
vehicle. Without the right to acquire information or to formulate ideas, 
the right to speak would be meaningless. 
building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our 
people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censor-
ship." ld. at 95-96. 
74. See TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY, supra note 71, at 4-5. 
75. See ORIGINS, supra note 27, at 179-205; C. SAGAN, THE DRAGONS OF EDEN 22·79 
(1977). 
76. To Thomas Jefferson self-fuliillment was one of the basic drives of man. Gary 
Wills observed: 
Within its original rich context, the pursuit of happiness is a phenomenon both 
obvious and paradoxical. It supplies us with the ground of human right and the goal 
of human virtue. It is the basic drive of the self, and the only means given for 
transcending the self. As Hutchenson put it: "The several rights of mankind are 
therefore first made known by the natural feelings of their hearts, and their 
natural desires pursuing such things as tend to the good of each individual or those 
dependent on him; and recommending to all certain virtuous offices." Men in the 
eighteenth century felt they could become conscious of their freedom only by 
discovering how they were bound: When they found what they must pursue, they 
knew they had a right to pursue it. 
G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA 247 (1979) [hereinafter cited as WILLS). 
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Another aspect of self-fulfillment focuses on the relationship be-
tween an individual and his government. The right of an individual to 
receive fair treatment from the state can likewise be assured only if he 
can communicate his needs to the government and can participate in 
the decisions made by the state. An individual must be free to voice 
dissatisfaction with acts of the state, to petition for benefits, or to give 
one's point of view to those who govern. 
The second basic interest promoted by the first amendment focuses 
on the benefits of free expression to society.77 This approach, labeled 
"utilitarian,"78 has sometimes been narrowly viewed as extending only 
to the discussion of public or political issues which are essential to in-
telligent self-government in a democratic system.79 More recently it 
has been argued that societal interests are broader and that the first 
amendment was meant to promote discussions of philosophical, social, 
artistic, economic, or ethical matters.80 
77. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 
U.S. 234 (1957), stated: 
For society's good-if understanding be an essential need of society-inquiries into 
these problems, speculations about them, stimulations in others of reflections upon 
them must be left as unfettered as possible. Political power must abstain from in-
trusion into this activity of freedom, pursued in the interest of wise government 
and the people's well-being, except for reasons that are exigent and obviously com-
pelling. 
"Freedom to reason and freedom for disputation on the basis of observation and 
experiment are the necessary conditions for the advancement of scientific 
knowledge." 
!d. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
10-12). In Sweezy a teacher's refusal to answer questions about his lectures at the Univer-
sity of New Hampshire and his knowledge of the Progressive Party led to his conviction 
under the state's Subversive Activities Act. The Supreme Court overturned the convic-
tion. !d. at 255. 
78. Justice Rehnquist describes the utilitarian approach as follows: 
The ••. "utilitarian" justification, sees this right of the citizen as a means to the 
end of achieving certain social purposes. Whether cast in terms of the need for an 
informed electorate, or the desirability of a · free flow of ideas for non-political 
reasons as well, the citizen's right to speak out exists not so much because it 
benefits him but because it benefits society . ... 
[This view], treats as the highest end of society the maintenance of an informed 
electorate .•.. As Alexander Meiklejohn, the primary exponent of this viewpoint in 
modern times, has said: "Self-government can exist only insofar as the voters ac-
quire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general 
welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express." 
Rehnquist, supra note 71, at 3-4 (quoting Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Ab-
solute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 255 (emphasis in original). See also FREE SPEECH, note 71 
supra; POLITICAL FREEDOM, note 71 supra. 
79. TRIBE, supra note 46, at 577. 
80. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977). See TRIBE. supra note 46, 
at 577. 
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As is the case with individual self-fulfillment, society's interests in 
an informed citizenry81 cannot be adequately protected unless the 
rights incident to speech are also recognized. While it is true that the 
first amendment expressly refers to speech, it is also apparent that 
certain non-communicative activities are of equal importance in carry-
ing out first amendment policies. The Supreme Court has recognized 
this fact on numerous occasions and has given protection to these cor-
ollary activities.82 
Underlying both the interest of the individual and the interest of 
society is a fundamental premise that individuals and government will 
make the best decisions only when they have the most reliable infor-
mation available. The first amendment acts as the mechanism for 
fulfillment of individual and societal interests, since it assures a pro-
cess to determine the truth of a particular matter.83 It has long been 
recognized that the best way to insure that individuals and societies 
arrive at the truth is through the free exchange of ideas in the 
marketplace.84 Even before the first amendment was drafted, the need 
for a free exchange of ideas was understood. More than 300 years ago, 
81. This broad social interest was recogni2ed in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 
(1957), in which the Court stated, "The protection given speech and press was fashioned to 
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about the political and social 
changes desired by the people." Id. at 484. 
In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi2ens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 
(1976), a statute that held a pharmacist guilty of unprofessional conduct if he engaged in 
price advertising was attacked as a violation of the first and fourteenth amendments. The 
Court recogni2ed that a consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information 
could be keener than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate. Id. at 763-64. 
"Generalizing, society also may have a strong interest in the free flow of commercial in-
formation." Id. at 764. 
The Supreme Court in striking down a Massachusetts law that prohibited corporations 
from spending funds to influence referenda elections, recognized the public's right to 
receive information from corporations. The Court noted that "the people in our democracy 
are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of 
conflicting arguments." First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 (1978). 
82. See note 69 supra. 
83. As Justice Brandeis stated in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), "They 
[the founding fathers] believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the 
secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you 
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth ... .'' Id. at 
375. 
84. Professor Emerson suggests that: 
It is essential to note that the theory [of free speech] contemplates more than a 
process for arriving at an individual judgment. It asserts that the process is also 
the best method for reaching a general or social judgment. Through the acquisition 
of new knowledge, the toleration of new ideas, the testing of opinion in open com-
petition, the discipline of rethinking its assumptions, a society will be better able to 
reach common decisions that will meet the needs and aspirations of its members. 
TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY, supra note 71, at 8. 
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the English Parliament enacted a statute which provided that no books 
could be printed or sold without first obtaining a license. John Milton, 
in attacking the statute stated, "Truth and understanding are not such 
wares as to be monopolized and traded in by tickets and statutes and 
standards."85 
Justice Holmes, in one of his famous dissents, laid the groundwork 
for incorporating a marketplace of ideas into the first amendment: 
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly 
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want 
a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes 
in law and sweep away all opposition .... But when men have realized 
that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe 
even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct 
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in 
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the 
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at 
any rate is the theory of our Constitution.86 
This concept of the marketplace of ideas subsequently has been ac-
cepted by the majority of the Supreme Court in several opinions.87 
From these cases there can be gleaned three activities which are 
necessary for the effective functioning of the marketplace: (1) the ac-
quisition of information; (2) the development of ideas or concepts; and 
(3) the communication of ideas.88 
85. Milton, Areopagitica, in POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (N. 
Dorsen, P. Bender & B. Neuborn ed. 1976). 
86. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, 
J ., dissenting). 
87. For example in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the Court 
stated: 
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace 
of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail .... It is the right of the public to 
receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and ex-
periences which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged 
either by Congress or by the FCC. 
Id. at 390. 
In a case dealing with a state law requiring the signing of loyalty oaths by college pro-
fessors, the Court stated, "The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Na-
tion's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange 
of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any 
kind of authoritative selection.'" Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) 
(quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943)). See also Sweezy 
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. at 250. 
88. It could be argued that science was the first institution to make use of the con-
cept of the marketplace and that the framers of the Constitution were well aware of its 
value as a truth-seeking mechanism. In fact, during the 18th Century this concept was 
adopted by the developing social and political institutions of the time. See text accompany-
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In a variety of fact situations, the Supreme Court has recognized a 
right to acquire information. The Court has upheld such a right in con-
nection with the door-to-door distribution of religious material,S9 the 
receipt of sexually explicit material,90 the receipt of political propaganda 
from abroad,91 and receipt by consumers of information about prescrip-
tion prices92 and availability of real property.93 In all of these decisions, 
the Court analyzed the policy underlying the first amendment and con-
cluded that these activities must be protected as necessary incidents 
to speech. 
The second necessary element of the marketplace is the develop-
ment of ideas or concepts. In the United States most people take the 
right to think for granted. History is replete with tales of attempts to 
control what men believe and think,94 however, and even the United 
States, long considered a free country, is not without examples of in-
ing notes 254-63 infra. See also ORIGINS OF KNOWLEDGE. supra note 21, at 121-37; WILLS, 
supra note 76, at 93-164. 
89. In Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), the Court struck down an or-
dinance which banned door-to-door distribution of literature as applied to a Jehovah's 
Witness who sought to advertise a religious meeting. The Court held that the ordinance 
infringed on the rights of individual householders to decide whether or not to receive in-
formation as well as the right of the distributor to disseminate such information. The 
"right to receive" was "necessarily" protected by the first amendment since its purpose 
was'to promote enlightenment over ignorance. Id. at 143. 
90. In reversing a criminal conviction for knowingly having possession of obscene 
matter, the Court in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), focused on the issue of ob-
taining the material in question. "It is now well established that the Constitution protects 
the right to receive information and ideas. 'This freedom [of speech and Press] • . . 
necessarily protects the right to receive ... .' Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 
143 .... This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, see 
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948), is fundamental to our free society.'' Id. at 
564. 
91. In Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965), the Court held that a post office 
regulation which required that addressees of Communist political propaganda from abroad 
affirmatively request its delivery violated the first amendment. In a concurring opinion 
Justice Brennan stated: "I think the right to receive publications is ••• a fundamental 
right. The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees 
are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that 
had only sellers and no buyers." Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
92. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, 425 U.S. 
748 (1976). 
93. In Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), the Supreme 
Court struck down a township ordinance that prohibited the posting of for sale or sold 
signs on real estate. The Court's holding was based at least in part on the recognition of 
the right of the would be purchasers to receive information concerning the availability of 
real property. Id. at 92. 
94. Galileo encountered similar difficulties with his beliefs. See note 1 supra. Lysenko 
with the aid of Stalin attempted such control in Russia. See note 45 supra. 
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tolerance for the beliefs and thoughts of others.95 While it appears en-
croachment by the government upon one's thoughts or beliefs is a 
remote possibility, the potential for such action nevertheless exists. 
Over fifty years before the drafting of the first amendment the 
necessity of free thought was acknowledged by Mrs. Silence Dogood, 
also known as Benjamin Franklin: · 
Without freedom of thought, there can be no such thing as wisdom, and 
no such thing as publick [sic] liberty, without freedom of speech; which 
is the right of every man, as far as by it, he does not hurt or controul 
[sic] the right of another; and this is the only check it aught to suffer, 
and the only bounds it aught to know.96 
Franklin's beliefs are at the core of the first amendment and have 
been reiterated by the Supreme Court. In Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Education the Court observed, "For at the heart of the First Amend-
ment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he 
will and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his 
mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State."97 
Ideas, which are the product of the human mind, are the goods of 
the marketplace. Without ideas there could be no marketplace. 
Moreover, if the marketplace is to fulfill its function of truth seeking, 
all ideas must be available for consideration. 
The final element of the marketplace is the communication of ideas. 
The focus of concern here is with the channels of communication ,and 
not the content. Any interference with these channels of communica-
tion will restrict the number of ideas available to the marketplace. In 
keeping open the channels of communication the Supreme Court has 
found it necessary to give constitutional protection to activities that 
are not speech. 
A prime example in which the Court sought to keep the channels of 
communication open is Buckley v. Valeo. 98 In this case the key provi-
sions of the Federal Election Campaign Act99 were challenged as 
abridging the first amendment freedom of speech. Of particular con-
cern was the provision which set a $1000 limit for expenditures by in-
dividuals and groups relative to a clearly identified candidate. The 
Court discussed the power of the federal government to control the ex-
95. Rice, The High Cost of Thinking the Unthinkable, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Dec. 1973, . 
at 89 [hereinafter cited as Rice]; see note 142 infra. Textbook censorship is a growing 
phenomenon. Citizen committees have forced local school boards to ban such work as 
Shakespeare's plays and Webster's International Dictionary. Detroit News, Mar. 14, 1980, 
at 1A, col. 6. 
96. I. COHEN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, HIS CONTRIBUTION TO AMERICAN TRADITION (1953). 
97. 431 U.S. at 234-35. 
98. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
99. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 
1263 (amended 1976). 
HeinOnline -- 19 Duq. L. Rev. 679 1980-1981
1981 Scientific Inquiry 679 
penditure of money in the political process and specifically recognized 
that while the expenditure of money was not, per se, a communicative 
act, it was so closely intertwined with expression, that any abridgment 
of the expediture process would be an abridgment of speech.100 Even 
though the regulation did not focus on ideas expressed by an in-
dividual, it directly imposed quantity restrictions on the political com-
municative process, by placing a $1000 expenditure ceiling for any in-
dividual relative to any particular candidate.101 Implicit in the Court's 
discussion is the proposition that any significant limitation on quantity 
must ultimately lead to a reduction of the quality of the speech. Such a 
limitation would severely limit the number of ideas available in the 
marketplace to further the truth-seeking process. The Supreme Court 
has recognized that certain activities are by nature an integral part of 
the communicative process and, therefore, protected by the first 
amendment.102 
In light of the above discussion, it is now appropriate to focus on 
scientific inquiry. As previously stated, many of the activities of scien-
tific inquiry are communicative. In order to insure that there is a 
meaningful exercise of this right, it will be shown that it is necessary 
to protect all the non-communicative aspects of scientific inquiry. It is 
only in this way that goals of individual and societal development, in-
cluding truth seeking, can be fully realized. 
Scientific inquiry can be broken down into component parts to 
facilitate identifying the communicative and non-communicative com-
ponents. Non-communicative components will further be examined to 
determine whether or not each is essential to the communicative com-
ponents and, thus, are necessary incidents of speech. The four essential 
components of scientific inquiry are: observation, formulation of 
hypothesis, experimentation, and communication.103 It should be 
recognized that in most cases the dividing line between these com-
ponents is not distinct, thereby resulting in overlap, feedback, and 
discontinuity. These elements will be discussed in order descending 
from the most to least communicative, rather than following the normal 
progression of the process of scientific inquiry. 
a. Communication 
The advancement of science has always been heavily dependent 
upon written and oral expression. Over the centuries, communication 
100. 424 U.S. at 16-17. 
101. ld. at 17-22. 
102. See note 69 supra. 
103. This breakdown follows the steps in the scientific method previously discussed. 
See notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra. 
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among scientists and the free exchange and discussion of ideas has 
been the mechanism used to insure the reliability of scientific informa-
tion. Free dissemination of information through a marketplace 
mechanism has been a tradition with scientists, and the source of its 
unique capability for self-correction.104 Since the Court is willing to give 
general recognition to the value of the marketplace, it certainly should 
do so in the context of scientific inquiry. 
Written expression is equally important because of the cumulative 
aspect of science. The barriers of time, distance, and death require the 
availability of written information. Each scientist, is making his con-
tribution, relies on the work of those that have preceded him.105 
Without the basic research which produced the discovery of the double 
helix structure of the DNA molecule, for instance, research on recombi-
nant DNA would not be possible.l06 
Scientific communication may arise in a wide variety of cir-
cumstances. For example, oral expression may involve the presentation 
of a paper at a scientific society meeting, panel discussions, private 
conversation in person or by telephone, or testimony before a congres-
sional committee. Written expression may consist of letters, reports, 
and publications in scientific journals. All of these examples of the 
communicative component of scientific inquiry should be considered 
speech protected under the explicit language of the first amendment. 
b. Observation 
One of the methods by which scientists acquire information is obser-
vation. Scientific observation entails passive data gathering; that is the 
act of recognizing and noting natural occurrences. It is carried out 
directly by viewing natural phenomena or indirectly by receiving infor-
mation from others. Observation is often the beginning point of scien-
tific inquiry. One of the most famous examples of the observation of a 
natural phenomenon triggering the scientific process is Isaac Newton's 
observation of the apple falling to the ground/07 which led to Newton's 
articulation of the laws of gravitation. 
104. ORIGINS OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 21, at 122. 
105. Newton was modest about his achievements. He once said that if he had seen fur-
ther than others "it was by standing upon the shoulders of giants." F. RuTHERFORD. G. 
HOLTON & F. WATSON. PROJECT PHYSICS 112 (1975). 
106. An example of this building process can be found in an article relating the most 
recent advances in the attempt to understand how the DNA code begins the process of 
cell division. In discussing their work the authors acknowledge the contributions of seven 
other scientists who prior work allowed them to proceed along the path of scientific in-
quiry. De Robertis & Gurdon, Gene Transplantation and the Analysis of Development, 
SCIENTIFIC AM., Dec. 1979, at 74-82. 
107. W. DURANT, THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV 536-43 (1963) 
HeinOnline -- 19 Duq. L. Rev. 681 1980-1981
1981 Scientific Inquiry 681 
Observation is just as essential to the sc~entific process today. The 
observation of such phenomena as black holes/08 lung arteries/09 the 
surface of the planet Venus,110 and volcanoes of Jupiter's moon,111 
however, can only be made with sophisticated instruments. In the 
above examples, the information gathered was a necessary precondi-
tion to the advancement of science. But until the technological means 
of acquiring the information was available, the respective areas of 
science and scientific communications could not go forward. Govern-
mental interference with the acquisition of information would similarily 
frustrate the underlying policies of the first amendment. Limiting 
observation would prevent the individual scientist frqm reaching his 
goal of self-fulfillment, since it would hinder his primary goal of seek-
ing knowledge of the universe,112 and would hamper his professional 
development within the institution of science.113 
From society's perspective, interference with the acquisition of in-
formation will impair the truth-seeking function of the marketplace. 
Normally, once the data is received into the scientific community, it is 
thoroughly analyzed and discussed. The data is interpreted, laws are 
formulated, and further theories are postulated. Data obtained from 
observation is the fuel for the scientific process. Without new data, ex-
pansion of the body of scientific knowledge would stop. Ultimately the 
marketplace would become devoid of new ideas and the policy of the 
first amendment would be defeated. 
c. Formulation of Hypotheses and Drawing of Conclusions 
The formulation of an hypothesis and the drawing of conclusions are 
basically mental processes. This component would include all 
theoretical work. If any a~tivity would be classified as a necessary 
precondition to the meaningful exercise of the expression, it must be 
an ability to think as one chooses.114 The right to think, pursue, and 
108. A Supermassive Obiect in Galaxy M87, 113 Sci. NEWS 308 (1978). 
109. Unzipping Blood Vessel Linings, 113 Sci. NEWS 346 (1978). 
110. Probes Bound for Venus Atmosphere, 114 SciNEWS 100 (1978). 
111. Voyager 1: Active lo, Jolting Jupiter, 115 Sci. NEWS 165 (1979). 
112. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra. 
113. One of the key methods of advancement within the scientific community is by 
publishing the results of experimentation. H. MENARD, SCIENCE: GROWTH AND CHANGE 
84-128 (1971). 
114. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of this activity to the scien-
tific process: 
Progress in the natural sciences is not remotely confined to findings made in the 
laboratory. Insights into the mysteries of nature are born of hypothesis and 
speculation .... For society's good-if understanding be an essential need of 
society-inquiries into these problems, speculations about them, stimulation in 
others of reflection upon them, must be left as unfettered as possible. 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. at 261. 
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develop one's ideas is essential to the scientist because it is the 
essence of science to pursue knowledge, to question and investigate 
any subject, and to hold and state whatever conclusions naturally flow 
from such investigation.115 
Like observation, the development of ideas or concepts is essential 
to the communicative activities of science because the marketplace 
could not function without the benefit of intellectual reflection. Infor-
mation gathered from observation could not be fully utilized without 
proper interpretation. From this interpretation flow the various laws 
and paradigms which are the goals of scientific inquiry. 
d. Experimentation 
The formulation of a hypothesis will in the normal course of scien-
tific inquiry lead to the development of experiments to prove or 
disprove the hypothesis. For the purpose of this analysis, experimenta-
tion refers to the active collection of data obtained from controlled con-
ditions produced by human instigation.116 Unlike observation, which 
consists of passively receiving information, experimentation involves 
the creation of artificial, controlled conditions under which data can be 
obtained, experimentation is of special concern because it may involve 
the creation of risks to scientists, other humans, their property, and 
the natural environment.117 
The gathering of information is not unique to science. News gather-
ing is an important prerequisite for the effective exercise of freedom 
of the press. In the case of reporters, the Court has recognized that ac-
tive news gathering may be protected as a necessary incident to the 
right of freedom of the press.118 A parallel argument can be made that 
since experimentation is the active information-gathering step in the 
process of scientific inquiry it must be protected as a necessary inci-
dent of the communicative components of scientific inquiry.119 
Experimentation is an essential step in the scientific process120 
115. See text accompanying notes 52-53 supra. 
116. See text accompanying note 57 supra. 
117. See, e.g., note 221 infra. 
118. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972): "[We do not suggest] that news gather-
ing does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking 
out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated ..•. [R]eporters remain free to 
seek news from any source by any means within the law." Id. at 681-82. See Delgado & 
Millen, supra note 49, at 375-76. 
119. This argument is more fully developed by other commentators. See Delgado & 
Millen, supra note 49, at 371-81; Robertson, supra note 52, at 1226-40. 
120. While the Supreme Court has not yet expressly recognized a constitutional right 
to experiment, Justice Frankfurter acknowledged the importance of experimentation in 
the scien~ific process. "Freedom to reason and freedom for disputation on the basis of 
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because it is the component employed to acquire the data necessary to 
validate a hypothesis. Without experimentation the truth-seeking func-
tion of science would be severely hampered.121 As was the case with 
observation, without experimental data there would be nothing to com-
municate and the policies underlying the first amendment would 
likewise be frustrated. 
3. Speech Plus 
On several occasions the Supreme Court has characterized activities 
as "speech plus." For example, in the areas of public demonstration 
and picketing, the Court has held that if there is both speech and con-
duct, the activity may receive a lesser degree of protection than is af-
forded pure speech.122 This approach has been criticized by the text 
writers as an artificial distinction which creates more problems than it 
s~~? . 
Even if the analytical shortcomings of the speech plus approach are 
ignored, the approach still would not be applicable to scientific inquiry. 
The speech plus analysis deals with physical activities which are 
associated with a particular method of communication and which usually 
occur simultaneously with the communication. The activities of obser-
vation and experimentation do not occur simultaneously with com-
munication but are a necessary precondition to effective communica-
observation and experiment are the necessary conditions for the advancement of scientific 
knowledge. A sense of freedom is also necessary for creative work in the arts which, 
equally with scientific research, is the concern of the university." Sweezy v. New Hamp· 
shire, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 10·12). 
See also Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949), in which the Court stated: "[I]n the 
science of medicine, as in other sciences, experimentation is the spur of progress. It would 
amount to condemnation of new ideas without a trial to give the . . • power to condemn 
new ideas as fraudulent solely because some cling to traditional opinions with unquestion-
ing tenacity." ld. at 274. 
121. During the infancy of science the Greeks made no clear delineation between 
science and philosophy. Science was based mostly upon observation and reflection. Ex-
perimentation was not a part of early science. See STEARNS, supra note 26, at 8; WOOD-
BRIDGE, note 26 supra. See also note 28 supra. 
122. In Buckley the Supreme Court made the following observation: 
[I]n Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965), the Court contrasted picketing and 
parading with a newspaper comment and a telegram by a citizen to a public official. 
The parading and picketing activities were said to constitute conduct "intertwined 
with expression and association," whereas the newpaper comment and the telegram 
were described as a "pure form of expression" involving "free speech alone" rather 
than "expression mixed with particular conduct." 
424 U.S. at 17 (quoting 379 U.S. at 563-64). 
123. TRIBE, supra note 46, at 598-601. 
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tion.124 Additionally, these activities are not associated with any par-
ticular method of communication which might be used by the scientist. 
Thus, it is more appropriate to consider the physical activities involved 
in scientific inquiry as a necessary incident rather than "speech plus". 
4. Constitutional Standards of Review Under the First Amendment 
The Supreme Court has never developed a comprehensive set of 
tests to determine the validity of a governmental action which 
abridges speech.125 During the past few decades the spectrum of at- · 
titudes of the various Justices on the Court has ranged from a view 
that the right of expression is absolute,'26 to one that the right can be 
infringed upon a showing of a clear and present danger,127 to one allow-
ing abridgment if government interest outweighs the value of the com-
munication.128 
An examination of the cases indicates that the test to be applied in 
a particular situation depends first upon whether governmental regula-
tion is directed at speech; i.e., is content neutral.'29 If the regulation is 
aimed directly at the expression or the communicative impact of the 
activity, the abridgment will be unconstitutional unless the govern-
ment demonstrates that the speech or ideas represent a "clear and 
present danger,"130 are defamatory131 or obscene,132 or come within one 
124. The Supreme Court found the peyment of money in the political context did not 
constitute any "plus" conduct stating, "Yet this Court has never suggested that the 
dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a 
nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment." 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 16. Observation and experimentation, like the payment of 
money, are the preconditions to speech and necessary incidents that must be protected. 
125. POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 51-59 (N. Dorsen, P. Bender & 
B. Neuborne eds. 1976); see generally TRIBE, supra note 46, at 580-601. 
126. In Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134-62 (1959) and Konigsberg v. 
State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 56-80 (1961), Justices Black and Douglas in their dissents expressed 
the view that first amendment rights are absolute; see also Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 865 (1960); Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First 
Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 428 (1967). 
127. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Torke, Some Notes on the Pro-
per Uses of the Clear and Present Danger Test, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1. 
128. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case 
Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: 
The Case of Justice Powen 24 STAN. L. REv. 1001 (1972). 
129. TRmE, supra note 46, at 580. 
130. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
131. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
132. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
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of the other narrow categorical exceptions;133 or that the governmental 
impingement is necessary to further a compelling state interest.134 If 
the regulation advances a substantial governmental interest, other 
than controlling the ideas or information generated by scientific inquiry, 
then an incidental abridgment will be permitted if its restriction is no 
greater than required to the furtherance of the governmental 
interest.135 
a. Restraints Directed at Expression 
(i) Protection from Imminent Lawless Action 
It has long been recognized that the state has a compelling interest 
in protecting its citizens from the dangers of imminent lawless action. 
Any state regulation that seeks to protect this interest must satisfy 
the requirements of what has become known as the clear and present 
danger test. The clear and present danger test was first articulated in 
Schenck v. United States, 138 and refined in a series of cases culminating 
in Whitney v. CaliforniaP7 in which Justice Brandeis stated: 
[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, 
unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may 
befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to 
expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil 
by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more 
speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify 
repression.138 
Subsequently, in Dennis v. United States/39 the Court, while referring 
to Whitney, retreated from the strictness of the test. Finally in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio140 the Court restricted the tests of the prior 
cases, stating that a state may not "forbid or proscribe advocacy of the 
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed 
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite 
or produce such action."141 
133. For example, the state has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens against 
false advertising. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
425 u.s. 748 (1976). 
134. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
135. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 381. 
136. 249 U.S. at 52. 
137. 274 u.s. 357 (1927). 
138. ld. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
139. 341 u.s. 494 (1951). 
140. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
141. ld. at 447. 
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In order to qualify for analysis under the clear and present danger 
test, a case must, in the first instance present the possibility that the 
speech would lead to imminent violence or other lawless actions. In the 
area of scientific inquiry this situation could arise when a scientist 
presents the results of his research to a hostile audience, but it would 
be rare, since most scientific presentations would not generate anger 
or hostility of such a dangerous degree. 
Consider the situation where a geneticist presents a speech based 
on his own research from which he has concluded that because of dif-
ferent genetic development a particular race has a lower average in-
telligence level than other races.142 The presentation of a speech on 
that subject could give rise to two different motivations for a govern-
mental prohibition of the presentation. First, the information contained 
in the speech could have severe social, economic, and political conse-
quences. Such information would disrupt present governmental pro-
grams aimed at achieving racial equality.143 The speech could also 
result in psychological trauma to individual members of that race. In 
spite of these adverse consequences, the clear and present danger test 
as currently articulated would not justify governmental intrustion. The 
"incidence of the evil apprehended" is not so imminent that there is no 
opportunity for full discussion.144 Whether the views of the scientist 
are true or false plays no part in justifying government prohibition 
under this theory. If the scientist's conclusions are true, the test pro-
vides no justification for prohibition. If the theory is false there would 
be "time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to 
avert the evil by the process of education .... "145 
The second reason for government intervention would arise not so 
much from the content of the speech, but because of the immediate 
circumstances surrounding his presentation and the potential for 
violence. Under the Brandenburg test two circumstances must be con-
sidered: the state of mind of the speaker and the potential for adverse 
audience reaction. If our scientist merely intends to convey the results 
142. In 1969, Arthur R. Jensen published an article entitled How Much Can We Boost 
LQ. and Scholastic Achievement? in which he presented evidence that blacks, as a group, 
score lower on I.Q. tests than whites. Based on his study, Jensen suggested that heredity 
may have more effect than environment in determining intelligence and concluded that pro-
grams of environmental enrichment were doomed to failure. 39 HARV. Eouc. REv. 1 (1969). 
Shortly thereafter, William Schockley, a Stanford physicist and Nobel laureate, concluded 
that blacks were genetically inferior and proposed to teach a course at Stanford based on 
his views. Rice, supra note 95, at 89. 
143. The presentation also could have political consequences since such scientific 
evidence contradicts one of the fundamental premises underlying our whole politicial 
system, namely that "all men are created equal." 
144. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. at 377. 
145. Id. 
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of his work to an audience, i.e., any group of listeners, he could not be 
prohibited from speaking. On the other hand, if he intended to incite 
imminent lawless action by his audience, then the first part of the test 
would be satisfied.148 
Presuming the first element of the test is satisfied, it is also 
necessary that the audience, given the surrounding circumstances, is 
likely to respond to the speech in such a way as to produce the lawless 
action.147 Some of the factors which might be significant in applying 
test are: size of audience, racial mix, location of speech, prior events, 
and weather conditions. For example, a speech given to a group of 
fellow scientists at an annual meeting in a resort area seems much less 
likely to produce imminent violence as a presentation to a gathering of 
members of the race in question on their home grounds.148 
Because of the nature of the clear and present danger test, it would 
never be appropriate to use it in evaluating governmental regulation 
which seeks to prohibit observing, hypothesizing, or experimenting. 
Since the vast majority of scientific work is done in private, it is 
seldom communicated to the public at large or in a posture of ad-
vocacy. Finally, with the limitations of the clear and present danger 
test it is most likely that the state will seek to justify any direct infringe-
ment on the basis of some other compelling interest. 
(ii) Other Compelling State Interests 
In addition to protecting citizens from the dangers of imminent 
lawless action, the state is permitted to abridge expression directly 
when advancing a compelling interest.149 These compelling interests 
arise in a limited number of circumstances wherein the state seeks to 
protect itself or its citizens from harm caused by the communication of 
ideas or opinions.150 In determining whether there is, in fact, a compel-
146. 395 U.S. at 447. 
147. An address either to members of the "inferior race" for the purpose of inciting 
them to riot and thus demonstrating their intellectual inferiority or an , address to 
members of a "superior race" for the purpose of inciting them to commit violence upon 
the inferior race would satisfy the test. 
148. In May of 1973, Hans J. Eysench, a British psychologist, gave a lecture at the 
'London School of Economics on race and intelligence based on views similar to Jensen's. 
As he began his speech, he was attacked by students who cut his nose, pulled his hair, 
and broke his glasses. In Jensen's case, demonstrators invaded his classes at the University 
of California and Berkeley and disrupted his lectures with heckling and bomb threats. 
Rice, supra note 95, at 89, 92. 
149. See TRIBE, supra note 46, at 580-84. 
150. In Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), Chief Justice Hughes gave the follow-
ing illustrations of exceptional cases involving direct infringement and justifying prior 
restraint: (1) restraints during wartime to prevent the disclosure of military deployments 
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ling interest which would justify a prior restraint, the Court has shown 
a willingness to go beyond a broad assertion by the state that a com-
pelling interest exists and to determine the existence of the interest 
for itself.151 For example, in the area of national security, the Court has 
held that the mere assertion of some general danger to national security 
is not sufficient to justify a prior restraint of speech. The Court has re-
quired the government to show that disclosure "must inevitably, 
directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to 
imperilling the safety of a transport already at sea .... "152 There are 
two requirements necessary to justify a prior restraint: (1) the injury 
must be certain to occur and (2) the harm must be irreparable.153 A for-
tiori it must be a situation in which more speech will not be an alter-
native remedy. 
Applying these concepts to scientific inquiry, the government may 
seek to justify a prior restraint to protect itself or its citizens from immi-
nent, irreparable harm.154 This harm might arise because the knowl-
edge gained from scientific inquiry is considered dangerous in and of 
itself, or the knowledge gained from scientific inquiry, if misused or 
abused, could lead to harm or injury. 
In seeking to protect itself, the government may invoke national 
security as a justification for restrictions on scientific inquiry. In most 
cases the prohibition would be directed at the disclosure of information 
gained from scientific work.155 For example, the government may 
or obstruction of the military effort, (2) enforcement of obscenity laws, and (3) enforce-
ment of laws against incitement to acts of violence or revolution. Id. at 716. 
The Court also upheld a direct infringement involving a subsequent restraint involving 
client solicitation by attorneys. The Court recognized the state's compelling interest "in 
preventing those aspects of solicitation that involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation, 
overreaching and other, 'vexatious conduct."' Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 
447' 462 (1978). 
151. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). 
152. Id. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. at 716). 
153. 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
154. The state also could abridge scientific inquiry through a subsequent restraint. 
For example, it could impose civil or criminal penalties for publishing false data. Such 
situations would probably be dealt with in the same way as defamatory statements. See 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254 (1964). 
155. In the fall of 1979, the government sought to enjoin the publication of a magazine 
containing an article which showed a cross section of a hydrogen bomb and a comprehen-
sive description of radiation coupling, along with two other concepts not found in the 
public realm. The government claimed that this information was "born classified" and 
disclosure would harm national security. The district court issued a preliminary injunction 
finding that "publication or other disclosure of the Secret Restricted Data contained in 
the Morland article would irreparably harm the national security of the United States." 
United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), dismissed mem., 610 F. 
2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). The Justice Department subsequently abandoned its efforts when 
the information was published elsewhere. N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1979, at AI, col. 6. 
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assert a compelling interest in preventing the disclosure of information 
gained from research on nuclear weapons, new concepts for tracking 
missiles or satellites, and intelligence-gathering techniques involving 
satellites. It is also possible, however, for the restriction to be directed 
at the other steps in the scientific process. The government might 
achieve the same result by prohibiting the experimentation necessary 
to generate the knowledge. 
A prior restraint on scientific inquiry would be justified if the state 
could show that an injury was certain to occur and the harm caused 
would be irreparable. In the case of national security the government 
would assert that if information generated by scientific inquiry is ob-
tained by a hostile foreign power it would be dangerous in and of itself 
since it could affect treaty negotiations or, alternatively, that the infor-
mation would upset the international balance of power. It could also be 
argued that certain information is dangerous because it could be used 
to develop technologies militarily advantageous to our enemies.150 
Assuming that the government sustains its burden of establishing 
that these injuries are certain to occur, it must also establish that 
more speech or post-publication punishment will not be a suitable 
remedy. Once the scientific information goes beyond the borders of 
this country, control of its application escapes the jurisdiction of the 
United States government. Therefore, the only practical stage at 
which control may be exerted is at the scientific level. In this situation, 
more speech within the United States cannot prevent the harm. The 
potential abuse or misuse of scientific information by foreign powers, 
gives rise to a compelling state interest justifying a state interference 
with science.157 
In addition to protecting itself, the state may occasionally seek to 
protect its citizens from harm caused by ideas or information. In cer-
tain situations the state may claim that information gained from scien-
tific inquiry can, in and of itself, cause harm when communicated to 
the public. The state of Arkansas sought to protect the mental and 
156. That the knowledge obtained from scientific inquiry might be abused or misused 
by the development of harmful technologies is not normally a sufficient justification for a 
prohibition of inquiry, because, as a less restrictive alternative, the governmental interest 
can be asserted at the development or the marketing stage to prevent harm. The first 
amendment policy of having a free exchange of ideas which can be tested in the 
marketplace would outweigh any governmental interest that seeks to protect its citizens 
by keeping them in a state of ignorance. 
157. In these cases, there remains a serious problem with overly broad security 
orders. Security orders, unlike other administrative regulations, are not subject to the 
normal open procedures which include notice, hearings, standards, and judicial review. 
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976). Given the existence of a constitutional right of scien· 
tif . .; inquiry, it will be necessary to re-evaluate the process by which the decisions to 
classify information are made. 
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emotional well-being of its citizens by enacting a statute which precluded 
the teaching of the Darwinian theory of evolution.158 The statute was 
clearly an attempt by the state to control knowledge which it con-
sidered dangerous or offensive to the religious beliefs of a number of 
its citizens. 
Advances in the areas of external human fertilization/59 fetal re-
search/60 recombinant DNA/61 and cloning 162 have likewise raised 
issues concerning the potential danger to citizens from the knowledge 
gained from research.163 The knowledge gained from scientific work 
may be considered "dangerous" in two respects. First, the knowledge 
may be used by the government or others to create technologies which 
could result in physical, moral, ethical, or social harm. Research into 
the chemistry of the human mind could lead to the development of 
158. The statute read: 
§ 80-1627. Doctrine of ascent or descent of man from lower order of animals pro-
hibited.-It shall be unlawful for any teacher or other instructor in any University, 
College, Normal, Public School, or other institution of the State, which is supported 
in whole or in part from public funds derived by State and local taxation to teach 
the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of 
animals and also it shall be unlawful for any teacher, a textbook commission, or 
other authority exercising the power to select textbooks for above mentioned 
educational institutions to adopt or use in any such institution a textbook that 
teaches the doctrine or theory that mankind descended or ascended from a lower 
order of animals. 
ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 80-1627 (1960), reprinted in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 99 n.3 
(1968). 
The United States Supreme Court struck down the statute because it improperly pro-
moted a particular religious view of the origins of man. Id. at 107-09. 
Arkansas has not given up its attempt to legislate the teaching and contents of science 
within the public schools. A law which will be effective in the fall of 1982 requires the 
teaching of creationism along with the theory of evolution. SCI. NEWS, April 4, 1981, at 
222. 
159. See Flannery, Weisman, Lipett & Braverman, Test Tube Babies: Legal Issues 
Raised by In Vitro Fertilization, 67 GEo. L. J. 1295 (1979); Grobstein, External Human 
Fertilization. SCIENTIFIC AM., June 1979, at 57. 
160. Gaylin & Lappee, Fetal Politics: The Debate on Experimenting with the Unborn, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1975, at 66. Pilon & Juliana, Cost-Benefit Ethics and Fetal 
Research, 3 HUMAN LIFE REV. 63 (1977). 
161. Bereano, Recombinant DNA: Issues on the Regulation of Basic Scientific 
Research, 20 IDEA 315 (1979); Berger, Government Regulation of the Pursuit of 
Knowledge: The Recombinant DNA Controversy, 3 VT. L. REV. 83 (1978). 
162. All About Clones, NEWSWEEK, March 20, 1978, at 68; Kinney, Legal Issues of the 
New Reproductive Technologies, 52 CAL. ST. B.J. 514 (1977). 
163. In the area of recombinant DNA research, fear has been expressed that the 
altruistic aims of the work may fall under the heartless rules of the marketplace. B. HAR-
ING, ETHICS OF MANIPULATION 159-211 (1975). It has also been argued that if the publication 
of scientific knowledge results in social consequences to any person, the truth is not worth 
knowing. LURIA, BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF ETHICAL PRINCIPLES IN GENETICS AND THE LAW 409 
(A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1975). 
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techniques which would make it possible for the government control 
large segments of the population.164 Second, the new scientific informa-
tion may be perceived by some to improperly influence an individual's 
ideas or beliefs. For example, some believe that the present concept of 
the family as an institution will be destroyed if through the use of new 
medical techniques life is procreated outside of the family 5etting.165 
Outside the area of national security, it is highly unlikely that the 
government will ever be able to suppress scientific inquiry on the 
basis of "dangerous knowledge." While the first amendment is not an 
absolute bar to prior restraints, the Supreme Court has clearly stated 
that any such retraint comes to the court bearing a heavy presumption 
against validity .166 
When the first amendment was adopted, Congress was well aware 
of the evils that flowed from the English licensing system which at-
tempted to control dangerous knowledge by requiring prior approval 
of the state or church authorities before publication.167 Today, any at-
tempt to control dangerous knowledge outside of the area of scientific 
inquiry would be unanimously recognized as contrary to the dictates of 
the first amendment. That the knowledge is scientific should not lead 
to a different result. Even if new scientific knowledge might ultimately 
be used for illegal or unethical purposes, this should not, by itself, 
justify a prior restraint. In these situations the alternative of more 
speech is available to counteract any perceived improper use. Addi-
tionally, the state will be able to control the misuse of such knowledge 
at the technological level. 
164. G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949). 
165. As a result of solicitation by the Ethics Advisory Board of the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare, the following comments concerning in vitro fertilization 
and embryo transfer were received: 
[T]here will be a strong demand for such extramarital uses of the clinical pro-
cedures-a demand which, if fulfilled, will further compromise "the virtues of family, 
lineage, and heterosexuality" or weaken "the taboos against adultery and even in-
cest." 
Other potential consequences considered adverse by some expert witnesses and 
commentators include: 
a. The development of commercial ovum and embryo banks. 
b. The genetic selection or manipulation of early embryos. 
c. The transfer of nuclei from adult individuals to early embryos, or cloning. 
d. Extracorporeal gestation, or bringing an embryo all the way to viability in 
the laboratory. 
Protection of Human Subjects; HEW Support of Human In Vitro Fertilization and 
Embryo Transfer: Report of the Ethics Advisory Board, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033, 35,045 (1979) 
(footnotes 01nittedl. 
166; New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 714; Bantam Books, Inc. v. 
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). 
167. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. at 713. 
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b. Restraints Not Directed at Expression 
(i) The Test for Indirect Restraint 
Vol.19:651 
The government might seek to regulate scientific inquiry, not because 
of the communicative content of scientific inquiry, but because of the 
governmental interests in the health and safety of its citizens or the pro-
tection of the natural environment.168 The advancement of these in-
terests may result in an indirect restraint on scientific inquiry. Problems 
of indirect restraint most often arise when the government seeks to con-
trol the method used by a speaker to gather or disseminate ideas or in-
formation.169 
A government regulation which results in an indirect restraint on 
speech is permissible if (1) it is within the constitutional power of the 
government, (2) it furthers an important or substantial government in-
terest, (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression, (4) the restriction is incidental, and (5) it is no greater 
than is essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest.170 
In the first instance any governmental regulation must be based on 
proper constitutional authority; i.e., the interest sought to be advanced 
must be one of proper concern for the government. In the case of state 
governments, the basis is normally the police power, which encom-
passes the power to protect or advance the public health, safety, or 
welfare.171 In the case of the federal government, the authority must 
flow from one of the powers enumerated in the constitution; e.g., the 
commerce power .172 
An examination of first amendment decisions indicates that the 
Supreme Court has recognized the following interests as substantial 
enough to justify the indirect abridgment of the freedom of expression: 
Protection of the selective service system,173 national security,174 grand 
168. By way of analogy, the government may seek to insure a proper atmosphere for 
children attending school by barring noisy demonstrations on streets adjoining schools 
while classes are in session. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). 
169. Thus, a governmental regulation prohibiting the use of sound amplification equip-
ment in residential neighborhoods, while seeking to advance the government's interests in 
protecting the well-being and tranquility of the community, would restrict an activity 
which conveys information. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
170. This test was articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. O'Brien, 391 
u.s. 367. 377 (1968). 
171. For a classic discussion of state police power, see Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 
(1894) (regulation of the method of fishing); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855) 
(regulation of the method of taking oysters). 
172. See TRmE, supra note 46, at 225-27. 
173. In United States v. O'Brien, in affirming a conviction for knowingly destroying a 
certificate issued by the Selective Service System, the Court held that Congress has a 
legitimate and substantial interest in preventing the destruction of draft cards to insure 
the availability of registrants for induction. 391 U.S. at 380. 
174. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1965). 
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jury investigations,175 and the proper functioning of the penal system.175 
The mere existence of a substantial interest, however, is not suffi-
cient to justify an indirect restraint. The regulations also must further 
the interest asserted by the government. In Buckley v. Valeo 171 the 
government argued that the expenditure ceiling of $1000 a year per 
candidate in the Federal Election Campaign Act was nec-essaTy to stem 
the reality or appearance of corruption in the election process. The 
Supreme Court recognized that this goal was within congressional 
authority but nevertheless struck down the provision because it failed 
to further this interest.178 The Court analyzed goals of the statute in 
light of its own experience and concluded that "[i]t would naively 
underestimate the ingenuity and resourcefulness of persons and 
groups desiring to buy influence to believe that they would have much 
difficulty devising expenditures that skirted the restriction on express 
advocacy of election or defeat but nevertheless benefited the can-
didate's campaign."179 The Court thus decided Congress had misjudged 
the effectiveness of this provision as a means of checking political cor-
ruption, and therefore found the expenditure portion of the statute to 
be an unconstitutional abridgment of free expression. 
When dealing with areas in which it has expertise, the Court ap-
pears to be willing to substitute its own judgment for that of the 
legislative branch.180 In the area of science, however, the Court may 
not have the expertise possessed by Congress or administrative agencies 
and may be unwilling to substitute its judgment for theirs should a 
175. In requiring that newsmen appear before a grand jury to give testimony, the 
Court recognized the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand 
jury investigations. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972). 
176. In evaluating a state prison regulation relating to the censorship of mail, the 
Court held that there was a "legitimate governmental interest in the order and security 
of penal institutions [that justified] the imposition of certain restraints on inmate cor-
respondence." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412-13 (1974). 
177. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
178. Id. at 47-48. On the other hand, the Court found that the portion of the Act that 
limited campaign contributions did further the governmental interest of a corruption-free 
election process. Id. at 26-27. 
179. Id. at 45. 
180. The Court has engaged in this type of analysis when the restriction was directed 
at the speech itself. For example, the prohibition on price advertising of prescription 
drugs did not advance state interest in maintaining high professional standards for phar-
macists. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748, 766-70 (1976). In another situation the Court found that the prohibition of "for sale" 
signs on residential real estate did not advance the state's interest in promoting racially 
integrated housing. Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1977). 
Finally, in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 
(1980), the Court, while recognizing the village's interest in protecting its citizens from 
fraud, crime, and undue annoyance, struck down as overbroad an ordinance that pro-
hibited solicitations by unqualified charitable organizations. Id. at 639 . 
• 
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case arise involving the regulation of scientific inqury.181 Furthermore, 
if the Court does attempt to determine whether the regulation furthers 
a particular goal, the judgment must be based on either its own insuf-
ficient expertise or on a reevaluation of the expert testimony 
presented at the trial of the case. It appears that the Court at present 
is ill-equipped to determine whether a particular regulation of scien-
tific inquiry furthers an important government interest. 
The requirement that the government's asserted interest must be 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression is really only another 
way of saying that the reglulation must be facially neutral; that is, it 
must not state or imply an intent to suppress ideas or information. It 
has been argued by commentators that even a facially neutral regula-
tion may be struck down if it was motivated by an intent to directly 
abridge speech.182 The right of free expression would be meaningless if 
the government could accomplish indirectly that which it could not ac-
complish directly. The Supreme Court, however, has shown an unwill-
ingness to examine the motives of legislative bodies.183 
A facially neutral regulation must only incidentally abridge freedom 
of expression. If such a regulation effectively cuts off access or leaves 
too little access to the channels of communication, it is unconstitu-
tionaJ.i84 A municipality, for example, may enact regulations designed 
to further its interest in keeping streets and sidewalks free of litter. A 
regulation banning the distribution of all handbills to futher this inter-
181. This reluctance to evaluate complex, technical subjects has already arisen in en-
vironmental law. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the Court in reviewing certain rule making activities of 
the Atomic Power Commission stated, "The fundamental policy questions [nuclear energy] 
appropriately resolved in Congress .•. are not subject to reexamination in the federal 
courts under the guise of judicial review of agency action." Id. at 558 (emphasis in 
original). See also Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under 
Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO. L.J. 699 (1979). 
182. TRmE, supra note 46, at 591-98. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH 208-21 (1962); Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burn-
ing Case, 1968 SuP. CT. REV. 1; Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem 
of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95; Ely, Legislative and Ad-
ministrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970) [hereinafter cited 
as Ely]. 
183. In O'Brien the Court reiterated, "The decisions of this court from the beginning 
lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise 
of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the 
power to be exerted." 391 U.S. at 383 (quoting McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 
(1904)). But see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252 (1977), where the court held that a violation of the equal protection clause could be 
established by a showing that a law was passed with a racially discriminatory intent or 
purpose. Id. at 264-68. 
184. TRmE, supra note 46, at 682-83. 
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est would not, however, be considered an incidental restraint since it 
has foreclosed a method of communication protected by the first 
amendment.185 
Finally, a regulation must be no greater than is essential to the further-
ance of the governmental interest. The Supreme Court in Martin v. 
Struthers188 struck down a municipal ordinance which prohibited ring-
ing door bells to distribute pamphlets since the privacy of individuals 
could be protected by the less drastic alternative of making it a 
criminal offense to ring a door bell after a home owner has made it ap-
parent that he does not wish to be disturbed. 
While it is possible that the government might indirectly restrain 
communication, observation, and formation of hypotheses, experimen-
tation is more likely to be affected since it is this component which 
generates most of the potential problems and is least like pure speech. 
When the government enacts regulations it most likely will be on the 
basis of advancing its interest in protecting its citizens. Protection may 
be required either because the experiment involves human subjects or 
the experiment imposes an unacceptable danger or harm to the public 
at large. 
(ii) Human Experimentation 
Assuming that experimentation is a necessary incident of speech, 
the regulation of experimentation with human subjects by the state 
would be permissible only if its satisfied the five point O'Brien test.187 
Although it was not formulated with regulation of science in mind, to 
illustrate how this test might operate in a typical regulatory setting, it 
will be applied to the existing HEW regulations on human experimen-
tation.188 The regulations expressly seek to safeguard the rights of sub-
185. The Supreme Court, in striking down an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of 
handbills because it allowed too little breathing space for communicative activities stated: 
Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience 
may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient 
to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of 
democratic institutions. 
We are of opinion that the purpose to keep the streets clean and of good ap· 
pearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully 
on a public street from handing literature to one willing to receive it. 
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161-62 (1939). See also Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 
(1960). 
186. 319 u.s. 141, 148 (1943). 
187. See note 170 and accompanying text supra. 
188. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.211 (1980). Although these 
regulations are applicable only to HEW-funded research, they will be discussed as if they 
were applicable to all experimentation. 
It could be argued that while the regulations on their face are limited to controlling 
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ject at risk; that is, those subjects who may be exposed to the 
possibility of physical, psychological, or social injury.189 This goal is car-
ried out by requiring that the experimenter obtain the informed con-
sent of the subject as well as prior administrative approval.190 
The first question which must be considered is whether the protec-
tion of subjects at risk is within the constitutional power of the 
governmental entity which has promulgated the regulation. If the 
regulations are promulgated by a state government, then under the 
concept of police power the state is able to protect or advance its 
interests in protecting the individual from tortious or criminal 
conduct.191 On the other hand, if the regulations are imposed by the 
federal government on all experimentation rather than as a condition 
to obtaining federal grants, then the regulations must be based on 
specific constitutional power.192 
The second element of the test requires that the regulations further 
an important or substantial governmental interest. In this example the 
two methods chosen by the government to protect the individual are 
administrative approval of the experiment and informed consent.l93 The 
grant money for research, they act as a de facto regulation of all research because the 
federal government provides the vast majority of the funds for this work. A denial of 
federal grants, therefore, is the equivalent of a legal prohibition. 
189. Id. §§ 46.102, .103(b). While the regulations do not detail specific injuries, one 
could presume the drafter had in mind tortious conduct such as assault, battery, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, or criminal conduct such as 
manslaughter or other statutory crimes. See generally Greenblatt, The Ethics and Legali-
ty of Psychosurgery, 22 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 961 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Greenblatt]. 
190. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.104, .109 (1980). 
191. See Greenblatt, supra note 189, at 975-80. 
192. The requirement that federal legislation be based on a specific constitutional 
power is part of the doctrine of enumerated powers. TRIBE, supra note 46, at 225. The 
most likely basis for supporting federal regulation of human experimentation would be 
the commerce power. Id. at 238-44. 
193. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (1980). The regulations give a fairly extensive definition of in-
formed consent. 
(c) "Informed consent" means the knowing consent of an individual or his legally 
authorized representative, so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice 
without undue inducement or any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or other 
form of constraint or coercion. The basic elements of information necessary to such 
consent include: 
(1) A fair explanation of the procedures to be followed, and their purposes, in-
cluding identification of any procedures which are experimental; 
(2) A description of any attendant discomforts and risks reasonably to be ex-
pected; 
(3) A description of any benefits reasonably to be expected; 
(4) A disclosure of any appropriate alternative procedures that might be advan-
tageous for the subject; 
(5) An offer to answer any inquiries concerning the procedures; [and] 
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consent requirement would indeed further the governmental interest 
since it protects a person against fraud or duress by insuring that he 
is not the unwilling subject of a scientific experiment or participates in 
the experiment without knowing the risks. If consent is obtained, 
however, it is unclear from the regulations exactly what interest the 
other requirement, prior administrative approval, seeks to further. If 
the regulations have as their sole purpose the protection of the subject 
from his own folly, they must be struck down as a violation of tne sub-
ject's right of privacy.194 If the regulations seek to further some other 
interest, they are silent as to what that interest may be. Other inter-
ests may include minimizing welfare costs incurred because of the in-
ability of the subject to care for himself or his dependents and prevent-
ing the injuries and death of subjects because they will be so alarming, 
widespread and of such grave dimensions that they threaten the very 
fabric of society.195 Assuming that the regulations were redrafted so as 
to reflect a proper interest, a court could determine whether the provi-
sions for administrative review further that interest.196 
(6) An instruction that the person is free to withdraw his consent and to discon-
tinue participation in the project or activity at any time without prejudice to the 
subject ..•. 
Id. § 46.103(c). 
Even with the above definition, however, there are significant legal problems with what 
the courts will accept as informed consent, particularly when a legally authorized 
representative is involved. It has been argued, for example, that a mother who is about to 
abort a fetus is not capable of giving informed consent. Markey, Federal Regulation of 
Fetal Research: Toward a Public Policy Founded on Ethical Reasoning, 31 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 675, 684 (1977); Siegal, A Bias for Life, 4 HUMAN LIFE REV. 109, 116 (1975). 
Another troublesome problem is that certain classes of individuals may never be 
capable of giving informed consent. In Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, a 
Michigan circuit court concluded that involuntarily detained mental patients cannot give 
informed and adequate consent to experimental psychosurgical procedures on the brain. 
Civil No. 73-19, 434-A W (Cir. Ct. Wayne County Mich., July 10, 1973), reported in part in 
42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (1973). The court's opinion is reproduced in A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY 
AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 902-24 (1974). See also 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 
751-66 (1978). 
Finally, since the entire process of scientific inquiry deals with unknown quantities, 
there is always the problem of having sufficient information to determine the degree of 
risk that will be actually faced. Thus truly "informed" consent may be illusive. 
194. In analyzing the constitutionally of a statute which required the wearing of a pro-
tective helmet by motorcyclists a court stated: "We accept .•. the fundamental tenet that 
the relationship between the individual and the state leaves no room for regulations 
which have as their purpose and effect solely the protection of the individual from his 
own folly." State v. Cotton, 516 P.2d 709, 710 (Hawaii 1973) (emphasis in original). 
195. ld.; People v. Poucher, 398 Mich. 316, 320, 247 N.W.2d 798, 800 (1976). 
196. Recent advances in several areas of science have raised difficult definitional prob-
lems concerning whether a subject is human. In the area of external human fertilization 
there is a question as to whether or not the joining of the sperm and egg creates a human 
subject. If the subject is not human it is doubtful that the state could prohibit all research 
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Turning to the third requirement of the O'Brien test, that the 
governmental interest is unrelated to suppression of free expression, 
the regulations are on their face neutral since they are not directed at 
the ideas or information to be gained from the experimentation. These 
regulations are merely restrictions on time, place, and manner since 
they do not preclude research. 
The fourth 0 'Brien test element deals with the incidental nature of 
the restriction. The requirement of consent would most likely be con-
sidered to have only an incidental impact on expression since it allows 
sufficient "breathing room" for experimentation.197 Similarly, the re-
quirements for administrative review appear on their face to be no 
more than an incidental restraint. Theoretically, this review procedure 
will not have the effect of foreclosing or severely restricting ex-
perimentation with human subjects, but as a practical matter, it may 
be found that the discretion to approve or disapprove a grant is overly 
broad.198 The basic standard in the regulation permits an institutional 
review board to deny approval if it feels that the risks to the subject 
are outweighed by the sum of the benefits to the subject and the value 
of the knowledge to be gained from the experiment.199 The regulations 
contain no objective criteria for valuing either benefits or knowledge, 
thus relegating the process to a subjective weighing of values. 
The fifth O'Brien criterion requires that the regulation be no 
greater than is essential to advance the government's interest. The re-
quirement of obtaining informed consent appears to be the least 
restrictive means of futhering the governmental interest in protecting 
its citizens against fraud or duress. The requirement is relatively unin-
trusive since it does not administratively or financially overburden the 
researcher or the subject. Attempting to apply this criteria to the ad-
ministrative review board, however, is very difficult. As previously 
mentioned, the regulations do not express a specific governmental inter-
est to be advanced by the adminstrative review board. Therefore, it is 
impossible to determine if the least restrictive means have been 
chosen to further an unstated interest. 
In the area of fetal research, a number of states have sought to con-
in this area. The state's interest would probably be limited to regulating the humane use 
of experimental subjects. See Grobstein, External Human Fertilization, SCIENTIFIC AM., 
June 1979, at 57. 
197. See Ely, supra note 182, at 1335-36; see generally TRIBE, supra note 46, at 682-83. 
198. In Saia v. State, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), the Court found that because of a lack of 
standards in the ordinance, a sound truck permit system was an unconstitutional abridg-
ment of the right of free speech. While admitting that the government has a right of 
regulation, the Court held that when discretion is granted to a state official, sufficient 
standards must be present to assure that the power is not abused. 
199. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(bl (1980). 
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trol scientific inquiry by enacting criminal laws which severely restrict 
or prohibit research on fetal subjects.200 Assuming that these statutes 
operate as an indirect restraint on· the constitutional right of scientific 
inquiry, they also must satisfy the five point O'Brien test.201 The first 
point of the test requires that the intent sought to be advanced must 
be one of proper concern for the state. While these statutes do not 
precisely state what interest is being promoted, even if that interest is 
the protection of human subjects they may be, at least in part, un-
constitutional. 
In Roe v. Wade 202 the Supreme Court struck down a Texas criminal 
statute which prohibited abortions except with respect to those pro-
cured or attempted upon medical advice for the purpose of saving the 
life of the mother.203 The Court set forth interests which could become 
compelling and thus justify the regulation of abortion.204 While 
specifically recognizing that the state had an important and legitimate 
interest in potential life, the Court held that this interest does not 
become compelling until the point of viability.205 The Court also held 
that a fetus is not a person within the meaning of the fourteenth 
amendment.206 Based upon this rationale, the Court determined that a 
woman's right of privacy had precedence over a state's interest until 
the point of viability. 
In light of Roe a state cannot justify its restrictions on fetal 
research by asserting that the fetus is a legal person. If the statutes 
are to be sustained, it would have to be on the basis of protecting 
potential human life. Because there was a direct infringement of a fun-
damental right in Roe, the Court required the state's interest rise to 
the level of "compelling."207 Assuming that the fetal research statutes 
only indirectly abridge the right of scientific inquiry, the state's infringe-
200. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25956 (West Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 
§§ 81-32,-32.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IND. CODE § 35-1-58.5-6 (Burns 1979); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN.§ 436.026 (Baldwin 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 14:87.2 (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. 
tit. 22, § 1593 (Supp. 1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 
1981); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 145.422 (West Supp. 1981); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 28-342 (1979); N.D. 
CENT. CODE 14-02.2-01 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2919.14 (Page 1975); PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 35, § 6605 (Purdon 1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-17 (197'[); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1953). 
201. See text accompanying note 170 supra. 
202. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
203. Id. at 166-67. 
204. The three interests recognized are the state's interests in the mother's health, 
maintaining proper medical standards, and protecting potential life. Id. at 163-64. 
205. The Court said, "With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in 
potential life, the 'compelling' point is at viability." Id. at 163. 
206. Id. at 157-58. 
207. I d. at 155, 162-64. 
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ment could be justified if the interest is substantial or important 
rather than compelling.208 
Various statutes impose liability depending on whether the experi-
ment is carried out in utero or ex utero and also on the status of the 
fetus;209 that is whether the fetus is live, viable, or about to be aborted. 
To the extent that the statutes protect a live fetus in utero they would 
be consistent with the state's interest in protecting potential life.210 
This interest would attach at the beginning of biological life and con-
tinue as long as the potential for human life exists.211 
On their face, these statutes satisfy the second and third elements 
of the O'Brien test since they further the important interest in protect-
ing potential life and do not appear to be aimed directly at the sup-
pression of scientific inquiry. The fourth element of the 0 'Brien test 
requires that the statutes be no more than an incidental restraint on 
scientific inquiry. Those statutes which would preclude all research ob-
viously violate this requirement.212 Most statutes do permit some 
research and each would have to be analyzed to determine if sufficient 
breathing room was allowed. At minimum the statutes should allow 
scientific inquiry which would not jeopardize potential life. Finally, the 
O'Brien test requires the restriction in these statutes be no greater 
than that essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest. 
Those statutes that impose criminal liability may violate this require-
208. The Court specifically recognized this distinction. See id. 
209. In the area of in utero fetal research, Utah, in UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-301 (1953), 
prohibits all experimentation with unborn children. Massachusetts, in MASS. ANN. LAWS 
ch. 112, § 12J (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981), and North Dakota, in N.D. CENT. CODE § 
14-02.2-01 (Supp. 1977), prohibit experimentation with any live human fetus whether 
before or after expulsion from the womb, unless the procedures are incident to the study 
of a human fetus while in its mother's womb and such procedures do not substantially 
jeopardize the life or health of the fetus. Maine (ME. REv. STAT. tit. 22, § 1593 (Supp. 
1976)), Indiana (IND. CODE ANN.§ 35-1-58.5-6 (Burns 1979)), and Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2919.14(A) (Page 1975)), forbid all ex utero experimentation without reference to the 
fetus being viable, non-viable, or dead. California (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE ANN. § 
25956(a) (West Supp_. 1981), Massachusetts (MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J (Michie/Law. 
Co-op Supp. 1981), and North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE§ 14-02.201 (Supp. 1977)) forbid all 
ex utero experimentation on live fetuses, except to preserve the life or health of the 
fetus. • 
210. The public ward theory might also justify control of in utero experimentation. 
The state might claim that such statutes are necessary to prevent the social and financial 
burden resulting from the birth of physically or mentally handicapped children. Based on 
this approach, the Massachusetts statute prohibiting any experiment which substantially 
jeopardized the health or life of the fetus which is carried to term could be justified. 
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981). 
211. Under this approach, the state would have an interest even in the situation of a 
fetus which is about to be aborted. 
212. See IND. CODE § 35-1-58.5-6 (Burns 1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14(A) (Page 
1975). 
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ment in that they may deter legitimate research by causing a scientist 
to be unnecessarily cautious. 
In the case of ex utero research, the existence of a state interest 
will depend upon whether the potential for life is present. If the fetus 
is ex utero and viable it is a human person and a state is entitled to 
give it full protection. If the fetus is ex utero and non-viable it appears 
that the state could not justify a restriction on research on the basis of 
protecting potential human life.213 
(iii) Experiments Which Impose Risk on the Public 
The state may also regulate scientific inquiry which causes injury or 
imposes risk upon the public,214 provided the five point O'Brien test is 
satisfied.215 The first three elements of the test pose no unusual prob-
lems when considering regulation of scientific inquiry in this context.218 
Nevertheless, when regulations are intended to protect the public at 
large and involve risk assessment, there is a possibility that they will 
not permit sufficient breathing room for scientific inquiry. As required 
by the fourth and fifth element of the 0 'Brien test, the court should 
use a balancing process to determine whether there is sufficient 
breathing room. The courts will weigh the extent to which scientific in-
quiry is prohibited against the magnitude of the benefits attained by 
enforcing the regulation. For example, research studying the genetic 
mutation of the bubonic plague bacillus would create certain risks to 
the public but it would provide science_ with potentially useful 
knowledge. In determining the extent of governmental interest, four 
risk factors should be considered: (1) the probability that an event may 
occur, (2) the probability of harm to any particular person or entity, 
(3) the seriousness of the harm if it occurs, and (4) the number of per-
sons or entities affected if the harm arises. The risks are then weighed 
against the value of the knowledge gained from the work to determine 
whether regulation or prohibition of the work would be justified. 
To provide a framework for analysis, while recognizing the desire of 
society to protect human life whenever possible, all research will be 
213. A secondary interest similar to that which justifies legislation requiring humane 
treatment of animals might be used to justify regulation, but not prohibition of ex utero 
experiments on a non-viable fetus. See Burr, Toward Legal Rights for Animals, 4 ENVT'L 
AFF. 205, 209-16 (1975). -
214. The term harm to the public includes not only death or bodily injury to human 
beings but also activities which can directly endanger life by damaging the environment 
or ecosystem. This section differs from the prior section in that the public is not the sub-
ject matter of the experiment and also because consent is impossible. 
215. See text accompanying note 170 supra. 
216. Regulations that seek to protect citizens from vaguely defined perils such as 
psychological or social injury, see, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b) (1980), may be insufficient to 
satisfy the first requirement of the O'Brien test. 
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placed into two categories. First, if an event may occur which will cer-
tainly result in death or serious injury to one or more persons, a 
presumption would arise that the state's interest in protecting human 
life outweights the value of the knowledge to be gained.217 In the case 
of the bubonic plague research, even if there is a relatively low prob-
ability that the bacillus will escape the laboratory, the fact that death 
or serious injury is certain to occur if it does escape would trigger the 
presumption. This presumption could be overcome by the presentation 
of evidence that the knowledge to be gained is of crucial importance to 
the advancement of scientific or social goals. 
The second category would encompass all other experimental work. 
To justify a prohibition the state must establish either that the 
knowledge to be gained is trivial or insignificant, or that the scope or 
extent of the harm will be of such magnitude that it outweighs the 
value of the knowledge to be gained. If serious injury or death is prob-
able rather than certain, or if only minor injury to persons or damage 
to property is certain to occur, no presumption on behalf of the state 
will arise. 
While the application of the balancing process appears straight-
forward, when applied to a particular situation, it becomes readily ap-
parent that the quantification of the various factors may be formidable. 
Some of the problems include choosing the proper units to measure 
risk and value (i.e., dollars, lives lost, aesthetics), making value 
judgments in these units (i.e., the dollar value of a human life), and 
determining the probability of the occurrence of an event without ex-
tensive prior experience.218 Notwithstanding these difficulties, it will be 
necessary in many cases to quantify these factors. The process should 
not, however, be reduced to a purely mathematical operation. 
Situations requiring the use of the balancing process could arise in a 
broad spectrum of factual settings. At one extreme, both the occur-
rence of the event and the harm may have a high degree of prob-
ability. For example, the above parameters might be present in an ex-
periment that seeks to study earthquakes by triggering an earthquake 
217. When it is certain that an event will occur which will cause injury, no further 
balancing is necessary and the state may prohibit the work since no one may justify com-
mitting a tort or crime on the basis that it is a constitutionally protected activity. See, 
e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 691. 
218. Before weighing can occur, it is necessary to quantify the various risks as well as 
the value of the scientific knowledge to be gained. This process has received much atten-
tion under the headings of "cost-benefit analysis" or "risk assessment." There is signifi-
cant disagreement as to the methodology as well as the ultimate usefulness of this pro-
cess. Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 Eco. L.Q. 207 (1978); 
Symposium: Risk-Benefit Assessment in Governmental Decision Making, 45 GEo. WASH. 
L. REV. 901 (1977). 
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which measures 9.5 on the open-ended Richter scale along the San An-
dreas Fault. Calculations show that there is an eighty percent prob-
ability that the tremors and shockwaves would extend into densely 
populated areas causing death to one or more persons. 
At the other end of the spectrum, both the occurrence of the event 
and the harm may have a very low probability. Scientists at M.I.T., for 
example, may wish to orbit a satellite observatory to study the forma-
tion of black holes and x-ray emitting stars.219 When the satellite falls 
back to earth, as it ultimately will, there is a one in a billion chance 
(.0000001 Ofo) that a window would be broken or some other injury caused 
by the remains of the satellite. 
In applying the balancing test to the first example, the state would 
be justified in a prohibition of the experiment. The event, if it did occur, 
would cause death to one or more persons. Since the sole purpose of 
the experiment was to verify calculations based on prior naturally oc-
curring events, the value of the work, while slightly advancing scien-
tific knowledge, would not rebut the presumption in favor of the 
government. Conversely, under the facts of the second example, the 
state would not be justified in prohibiting the experimentation. Even 
though the event is certain to occur, the likelihood of any harm is very 
remote and any injury would be of a minor nature. When these factors 
are weighed against the value of knowledge of the origins and nature 
of the universe, the balance must be struck in favor of the research. 
Between the two extremes suggested above lies a set of problems 
which will be more difficult to solve. Recombinant DNA research 
presents a situation in which there is some probability that an event 
could occur which will result in an unknown degree of harm.220 The 
primary concern is the escape of the recombinant DNA from the 
laboratory.221 The probability of the containment failure will depend 
219. Black hole stars are described in detail by Isaac Asimov in THE COLLAPSING 
UNIVERSE (1977). 
220. Recombinant DNA research can be described as the process by which scientists 
manipulate the genetic structure of a cell either by removal of chromosomes or by addi-
tion of chromosomes to a cell. The term "recombinant" refers to the process by which 
scientists chemically cut the DNA molecule apart, insert new chromosomes and then 
recombine its various fragments or portions into a new molecule. For a scientific discus-
sion of the process, see Cohen, The Manipulation of Genes, SCIENTIFIC AM., July 1975, at 24. 
221. In considering the problems of DNA recombinant research, a House Subcommit-
tee made the following observations: 
At the basic research level, opponents enter the philosophical level of debate and 
challenge the ability of investigators to ever quantify the benefits or the risk in a 
fashion to permit evaluation and intelligent decision making. The fear has been ex-
pressed that DNA recombinant research may somehow adversely affect the diversi-
ty of natural gene pools .•.• 
There are frequent and detailed analogies drawn between the dilemmas con-
HeinOnline -- 19 Duq. L. Rev. 704 1980-1981
704 Duquesne Law Review Vol.19:651 
upon the laboratory procedures followed in a particular experiment.222 
These procedures may vary from the use of material in unprotected 
labs to the employment of a biologically sealed room using filtered air 
and glove boxes. Depending upon which procedure is used, the prob-
ability of a containment failure varies widely.223 
If containment fails, then the probability of any harm occurring 
must be assessed. Depending upon the ability of the organism to survive 
fronted in the current nuclear power debates and the basic research proposals in 
the field of DNA recombinant research. Statements, occasionally in the form of 
demands, have been made that a full moratorium on all DNA recombinant research 
should be instituted until all of the social, legal and moral implications of this 
research have been thoroughly examined. Chargaff, for example, discussed the 
"awesome irreversibility of what is being contemplated." ... 
While it is more difficult to criticize the value of DNA recombinant work from 
the perspective of potential therapeutic applications, even here there are strong oppos-
ing opinions. Part of this concern is directed toward the fact that much of the 
research involves the use of E. coli, a microorganism which is a common inhabitant 
of the human intestine. Since this is an organism already adapted to the human en-
vironment, the concern is that accidents might result in easy entry and infection of 
human beings. 
If the host with the recombinant molecule carried all or part of an oncogenic 
virus, for example, or now had an unexpected resistance to drug therapy, or could 
produce some new and unexpected toxin, then human beings might be exposed to a 
disease which could reach epidemic proportions. The arguments about probabilities 
of escape, probabilities of survival if escape does occur, and probabilities that such 
an escaped host would indeed be pathogenic are described as impossible to 
calculate and therefore meaningless in terms of evaluating potential risk. The posi-
tion is that the opportunity for risk exists and therefore the research should not be 
conducted. 
STAFF OF SEN. COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON 
GENETIC ENGINEERING, HUMAN GENETICS, AND CELL BIOLOGY 36-37 (Comm. Print 1976) 
[hereinafter cited as REPORT ON GENETIC ENGINEERING]. 
222. The proposed federal guidelines define the terms: 
Containment is both physical and biological. Physical containment involves the 
isolation of the research by procedures that have evolved over many years of ex-
perience in laboratories studying infectious micro-organisms. P1 containment-the 
first physical containment level-is that used in most routine bacteriology 
laboratories. P2 and P3 afford increasing isolation of the research from the environ-
ment. P4 represents the most extreme measure used for containing virulent 
pathogens, and permits no escape of contaminated air, wastes, or untreated 
materials. Biological containment is the use of biological agents that are crippled by 
mutation so as to be incapable of surviving under natural conditions. 
Recombinant DNA Research, Proposed Revised Guidelines, 43 Fed. Reg. 33,042, 33,052 
(1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Proposed Guidelines]. See also Recombinant DNA 
Research, Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,912-21 (1976). 
223. For example, in changing the location of an experiment from an open-front 
biologically safe cabinet (P3) to a certified gas tight containment chamber (P4) there is at 
least a 10,000 to 100,000 reduction in probability of escape. Where biological containment 
is used, by requiring the use of a particular host vector system (HV2), the probability of 
escape is less than 1 in 100,000,000. 1978 Proposed Guidelines, supra note 222, at 33,053. 
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and propagate, as well as its potential to cause injury, there will be 
varying probabilities of harm.22' 
The third factor, the seriousness of the injury, can be anything from 
a common cold to death.225 Because DNA research involves a wide variety 
of organisms, it is not possible to regulate based on broad, general 
categories. Each classification of organism presents its own potential 
for harm. If the agent which escapes is certain to cause death or 
serious injury, a presumption would arise that the state's interest in 
prohibition outweighs the value of the knowledge gained from the 
work.228 The presumption could be rebutted by the proponent of the 
work presenting evidence that the knowledge to be gained is of crucial 
224. Because of the nature of this work, it presents the risk of producing by recom· 
bination of genetic characteristics a life form which might inadvertently escape into the 
environment and (1) produce human cancer or some other widespread infection, (2) in· 
crease antibiotic resistance in pathogenic organisms, (3) permit the survival of pathogens 
in environments not normally amenable to survival, or (4) possibly upset the natural 
evolutionary process. REPORT ON GENETIC ENGINEERING. supra note 221, at 36-37. 
In May of 1981, a special governmental investigation found that Martin J. Cline had im· 
properly used recombinant DNA within a human subject. This is the fll'st violation of the 
guidelines for the use of recombinant DNA which also violated the guidelines for human 
experimentation. No apparent harm to the human subjects was reported. SCI. NEWS, June 
6, 1981, at 357. 
225. Death might be caused by such pathogenic agents as Dengue virus or 
Schistososma Mansoni. 
226. Because of the seriousness of the potential injury the present HEW regulation 
prohibits the following work: 
I-D. Prohibitions. The following experiments are not to be initiated at the present 
time: 
I-D-1. Formation of recombinant DNA's derived from the pathogenic organisms 
classified(1) as class 3, 4, or 5(2) or from cells known to be infected with such 
agents, regardless of the host-vector system used. 
I-D-2. Deliberate formation of recombinant DNA's containing genes for the 
biosynthesis of potent toxins (e.g., ..• venoms from insects, snakes, etc.). 
I-D-3. Deliberate creation by the use of recombinant DNA of a plant pathogen 
with increased virulence and host range beyond that which occurs by natural 
genetic exchange. 
I-D-4. Deliberate release into the environment of any organism containing recom-
binant DNA. 
I-D-5. Deliberate transfer of a drug resistance trait to micro-organisms that are 
known to acquire it naturally, if such acquisition could compromise the use of a 
drug to control disease agents in human or veterinary medicine or agriculture. 
I-D-6. Large-scale experiments (e.g., more than 10 liters of culture) with 
organisms containing recombinant DNA's, unless the recombinant DNA's are 
rigorously characterized and are shown to be free of harmful genes.(8) 
We differentiate between small- and large-scale experiments with organisms con-
taining recombinant DNA's because the probability of escape from containment bar-
• riers normally increases with increasing scale. 
43 Fed. Reg. 33,070 (1978). 
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importance to the advancement of science.227 If the escape of the agent 
presents only a chance of permanent injury or death, then the work 
should be permitted unless the state establishes that the knowledge to 
be gained is de minimis or, that the scope or extent of harm will be of 
such magnitude that it outweighs the value of the knowledge to be 
gained. For example, the escape of foot and mouth disease virus, or 
sheep pox virus could cause widespread damage to animal herds, but 
not present a health hazard to humans. Once the state establishes that 
this widespread damage would occur, then the burden would shift to 
the proponent of the work to present evidence that the value of the 
knowledge to be gained from the work outweighs the harm. 
In the above example, as well as other cases, there is the recurring 
problem of the value of scientific knowledge. In making this value 
judgment, the court should determine the degree to which the par-
ticular scientific knowledge is critical to the advancement of science in 
that area and the importance of the research to society. If biochemists 
were prohibited from doing recombinant DNA work it would severely 
hamper further efforts to decode human genes which may ultimately 
lead to an understanding of the causes of many hereditary diseases.228 
Finally, even if the regulations satisfy the first four elements of the 
O'Brien test, they also must employ the least restrictive means of 
regulation. If the state can minimize or eliminate the risk involved by 
the use of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions rather than 
the prohibition, it must do so. This approach has been used in the present 
HEW regulations specifying physical and biological containment pro-
cedures to be used in carrying out recombinant DNA experiments.229 
The five point 0 'Brien test was formulated by the Court to deal 
with indirect restraints on free speech. It is apparent that this test can 
be successfully employed to evaluate government regulation of scien-
tific inquiry. The application of this test will provide the necessary 
guidance for the drafting of regulations which do not infringe on the 
right of scientific inquiry. By employing the 0 'Brien test it will be 
possible to give full protection to the right of scientific inquiry while 
allowing the government to advance its legitimate interests. 
227. This procedure is recognized under current HEW regulations: 
!d. 
Experiments in these categories may be excepted ..• from the prohibitions .•. [as 
described in note 223) provided that these experiments are expressly approved by 
the Director, NIH, on recommendation of the Recombinant DNA Advisory Commit-
tee after appropriate notice and opportunity for public comment. In making such 
exceptions, weight will be given both to scientific and societal benefits and to 
potential risks. 
228. Goodman, Genetic Engineering and Biochemistry, in SCIENCE FACT 128-35 (F. 
George ed. 1978). 
229. See generally 43 Fed. Reg. 33,069-178 (1978). 
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B. Scientific Inquiry as a Fundamental Right Standing Alone 
While the first amendment provides a basis for supporting a con-
stitutional right of scientific inquiry, it is not the only, nor even 
possibly the best, basis for this right. The Supreme Court has recognized 
certain rights not expressly enunciated in the Constitution .as so basic 
and fundamental that they are entitled to constitutional protection. 
The right to travel, for example, is not specifically mentioned any-
where in the Constitution, yet the Court as early as 1849 found such a 
right to exist.230 Justice Stewart has suggested that the reason for its 
absence is that the right is so elementary that the founding fathers 
felt it was unnecessary to provide for it specifically .231 
Other rights not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but which 
nevertheless receive its protection include the right of privacy,232 family 
rights,233 the right to be free from intellectual coercion by the govern-
ment,234 the right to obtain useful knowledge,235 and the right to vote 
and to have one's vote be worth as much as another's.236 
Since the language of the Constitution is not the source of the above 
enumerated rights, it is necessary to go beyond it. It has been 
suggested that there are two other possible sources from which fun-
damental rights flow. One is the constitutional structure and the 
values which that structure implies;237 the second possible source is the 
Court itself.238 
230. In his dissenting opinion in the Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1848), 
Chief Justice Taney stated: 
For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are 
one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States; and, 
as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass 
through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States. 
Id. at 492. See also New York v. O'Neil, 359 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1959); id. at 12-16 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177-81 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. 
at 181 (Jackson, J., concurring); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Williams v. 
Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900). 
231. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966). 
232. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 133 (1973); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
233. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
234; West Viriginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See Wooley v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Tribe, supra note 46, at 899-902. 
235. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S 390 
(1923). 
236. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
237. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 
981, 1031 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Lupu]. In his article, Professor Lupu postulates that 
structural concerns moved the Court to protect the right of interstate travel, and possibly 
certain voting rights. Id. 
238. The cases involving a right of privacy can be grouped under this heading. Id. at 
1032. The validity of, as well as the theoretical basis for, this second source has been the 
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1. Sources Within the Constitution- A Structural Basis 
While the right of scientific inquiry is not expressly authorized in 
the Constitution, the word science does appear within the text of the 
document. The Constitution's patent clause provides: "[t]he Congress 
shall have power ... to promote the progress of science and useful 
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the ex-
clusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."239 
While there is a lack of specific historical and legal authority ex-
plaining the background of this clause, a number of unstated premises 
can be inferred from its presence. First of all, the mere presence of the 
term science in this clause indicates that science and the scientific pro-
cess were known to the founding fathers. Second, given the limited 
number of topics addressed in the Constitution, apparently the 
drafters felt that science was of such importance that its progress 
should be promoted by federal governmental protection. Third, the 
drafters recognized that the principal agents in the promotion of 
science and the useful arts were authors and inventors. Fourth, this 
clause directs Congress to promote science and the useful arts, not by 
granting to authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their 
writings and discoveries but by securing them. From this it can be in-
ferred that individuals already possessed these rights and that the 
government was only furnishing protection.24° Finally, and most impor-
tantly, if authors and inventors had an exclusive right to their writings 
and inventions, the drafters must have presupposed freedom to engage 
in the activities which produced these products. 
While there is little historical material which would refute the 
above inferences, two potential problems must be considered. It might 
subject of much debate. There are critics who assert that only those activities should be 
protected which are specifically referred to in the text of the Constitution or where there 
are demonstrable standards to guide the Court. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 
510-24 (Black, J., dissenting). 
Others have argued against the process of finding fundamental rights by making a 
judicial value judgment since it is too subjective. Professor Ely states that such criteria 
as natural law, neutral principles, reason, or the idea of progress are not adequate stan-
dards. Ely, The Supreme Court 1977 Term-Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental 
Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 22-54 (1978). 
Those who support the use of judicial value judgments argue with equal vigor that it is 
possible for the Court to formulate fundamental rights using proper standards. Tushnet 
proposes the following criteria as a standard: (1) general agreement on the social impor-
tance of that right and (2) the settled weight of responsible opinion. Tushnet, The Newer 
Property: Suggestions for the Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 
261. 
239. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
240. H. Forman, in 200 YEARS OF ENGLISH & AMERICAN PATENT, TRADEMARK & 
COPYRIGHT LAW 27 (ABA ed. 1977). 
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be argued that the term science as used in the patent clause would not 
include science as we know it today. During the revolutionary period 
the term science had a broader meaning than it has now.241 It encom-
passed all bodies of organized knowledge including natural philosophy 
and natural history,242 two disciplines which encompassed the study of 
subjects which were the forerunners of modern sciences such as 
physics, zoology, and astronomy.243 Since natural philosophy and 
natural history were included within the term science, modern science 
would also be included. 
The second potential problem arises because the patent clauses 
employ the term inventor rather than scientists. At the time the Con-
stitution was drafted, inventor meant, first, one who discovers; and sec-
ond, one who creates something new.244 The first meaning would in-
clude the activity of experimentation as carried out by modern scien-
tists. The goal of any experiment is to find or discover information 
about the universe. Therefore, the term inventor as used in the patent 
clause is certainly broad enough to include the present day scientist. 
Given that science is found within the structure of the Constitution 
and that scientific inquiry is basically a search for knowledge,245 addi-
tional support for a fundamental right can be found in the decisions of 
the Supreme Court. On a number of occasions the Court has recognized 
a right to pursue knowledge. The Court has associated this fundamen-
tal right with a number of amendments. In Meyer v. Nebraska the 
241. In the seventh edition of Johnson's Dictionary, "science" is defined as: 
"1. Knowledge 2. Certainty grounded on demonstration 3. Art attained by precepts, or 
built on principles 4. Any art or species of knowledge 5. One of the seven liberal arts: 
grammar, rhetorick, logick, arithmetick, musick, geometry, astronomy." JOHNSON'S DIC· 
TIONARY (7th ed. 1785). 
242. It is interesting to note that James Madison, one of the authors of the patent 
clause, initially suggested the following language for the clause: "To encourage by 
premiums and provisions, the advance of useful knowledge and discoveries. To secure to 
literary authors their copy rights for a limited time." 1 A. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS 
§ 10, at 74 (1964) [hereinafter cited as DELLER]. When adopted by the Constitutional Con-
vention without dissent the phrase "the advance of useful knowledge and discoveries" was 
replaced with the phrase "to promote the progress of science and the useful arts." Id. at 
73-75. Thus, it may be inferred that the convention considered progress of science and 
useful knowledge to be equivalent terms. 
243. STEARNS, supra note 26, at 7. In Benjamin Franklin's proposal for the formation of an 
American Philosophical Society, subtitled "a proposal for promoting useful knowledge .•• ," he 
suggested that. various topics including botany, medicine, geology, mathematics, and 
chemistry ought to be discussed. He also suggested that there always be "at least seven 
members viz. a physician, a botanist, a mathematician, a chemist, a mechanician, a geographer 
and a general· natural philosopher." BENJAMIN FRANKLIN READER 319 (Goodman ed. 1945). 
244. DELLER, supra note 242, § 10 at 89-90. It is this second definition which has 
become the popular meaning of the term. 
245. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra. 
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court stated that the term liberty in the fourteenth amendment included 
the right to acquire useful knowledge.246 In Griswold v. Connecticut 
Justice Douglas, after citing Meyer, stated: "[t]the State may not, con-
sistently with the spirit of the First Amendment contract the spec-
trum of available knowledge."247 
Logically, if the Court is willing to protect such a right in the 
general sense, it would certainly do so in the specific case of scientific 
inquiry. This conclusion is further reinforced by Justice Douglas' 
observation, in discussing the the purpose of the patent clause, that 
"[t]he invention to justify a patent had to serve the ends of science-to 
push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the like; to make a 
distinctive contribution to scientific knowledge."248 Since the purpose of 
the patent clause was to advance scientific knowledge and the Court 
has recognized the importance of the pursuit of knowledge, it appears 
to follow that the scientist would have the right to engage in the pur-
suit of knowledge through scientific inquiry. 
In addition to the patent clause, other sections of the Constitution 
assume a close working relationship between science and government. 
One author notes 'these examples: 
That the power over coinage, weights, and measures would necessarily 
entail highly technical expert advice and scientific experimentation was 
axiomatic to educated men. A census was provided not so much 
because of curiosity as because the political compromises made it 
necessary; nevertheless the men of that time could visualize scientific 
uses for it.248 
The patent clause provides a structural basis supporting a constitu-
tional right of scientific inquiry. This conclusion flows from a logical 
analysis of the clause itself and is further supported by an examination 
of the historical context in which the clause was drafted.250 
2. Sources Outside the Constitution 
The Supreme Court has recognized the existence of certain fun-
damental rights not specifically mentioned in the Constitution prin-
246. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). For a discussion of the case, see note 251 infra. 
247. 381 U.S. at 482. For a discussion of the case, see note 251 infra. See also Wieman 
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), where Justice Frankfurter stated: "By limiting the 
power of the States to interfere with freedom of speech and freedom of inquiry and 
freedom of association, the Fourteenth Amendment protects all persons, no matter what 
their calling." Id. at 195 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
248. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950) 
(Douglas, J., concurring). · 
249. A. DUPREE, SCIENCE IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 6 (1957). 
250. See text accompanying notes 251-301 infra. While this historical analysis is in-
tended to support the second source of fundamental rights, it also lends support to the 
structural analysis. 
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cipally by an expansive interpretation of the ninth and fourteenth 
amendments.251 In doing this the Court has stated the test somewhat 
differently in each situation rather than formulating a single test for 
the determination of fundamental rights in all situations.252 
Professor Lupu has distilled the various statements of the Court into 
a two-part test to determine whether a right will receive protection 
under our Constitution. "(1) Historically, American institutions must 
have recognized the liberty claim as one of paramount stature," and 
251. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), a Nebraska statute which prohibited 
the teaching of foreign languages until after the eighth grade was at issue. The Court 
struck down the statute as an unreasonable infringement on "the liberty guaranteed ••• 
by the 14th amendment." Id. at 399. 
An ordinance that limited the occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single fami-
ly was at issue in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). The Court found 
that the statute as applied to the appellant and her grandsons was a violation of their 
substantive due process rights guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 
499-500. 
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court struck down a Connecticut anti-contraception 
statute. Three concurring Justices relied on the ninth and fourteenth amendments. See 
381 U.S. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court held that the state could not com-
pel members of the Amish faith to send their children to high school until age 16. This 
was based upon the Court's reading of the first and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 234. 
The right to privacy was found to exist within the fourteenth amendment by the Court 
in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153. For a discussion of Roe, see text accompanying notes 
202-06 supra. 
252. Justice Harlan, in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), recognized the difficulty in 
formulating an all inclusive test when he stated: 
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be 
found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere 
provided in the Constitution. This "liberty" is not a series of isolated points pricked 
out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion ••. 
and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom 
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints • • • • 
Id. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
One of the first articulations of the scope of the term "fundamental right" came in 
Meyer where Justice McReynolds observed, 
[Liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the 
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire 
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God 
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those 
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happi-
ness by free men. 
262 U.S. at 399. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the right was recognized as fundamental because 
it reflected "strong tradition" founded on "the history and culture of Western 
civilization." 406 U.S. at 232. Justice Goldberg, concurring in Griswold, spoke of a right 
that is fundamental and deeply rooted in our society. 381 U.S. at 491. In Moore the Court 
protected the sanctity of the family "because the institution of the family is deeply rooted 
in this Nation's history and tradition." 431 U.S. at 503. 
HeinOnline -- 19 Duq. L. Rev. 712 1980-1981
712 Duquesne Law Review Vol.19:651 
"(2) Contemporary society must value the asserted liberty at a level of 
high priority ."253 
a. The Historical Role of Science 
As will be demonstrated in the following material, America 
historically has recognized scientific inquiry as a liberty of paramount 
stature. From the earliest colonial times, the growth of American 
political and educational institutions paralleled the development of 
science and the philosophy of Enlightenment.254 Indeed, the maturing of 
the United States was intertwined with the growth of Enlightenment. 
The scientific work of Isaac Newton in England during the seven-
teenth century sparked the beginning of the Enlightenment Era in 
Europe.255 Newton's method of inquiry consisted of three basic steps: 
the observing of the events, the accurate recording of events, and the 
discerning of natural laws from these observations.256 Through the use 
of this method, Newton developed the law of universal gravitation. 
While the scientific principles he discovered would be the foundation 
of physics until Einstein's work 250 years later, his scientific way of 
thinking had an equally important impact beyond the boundaries of 
pure science. 
Newton's method of ordering the inanimate universe provided an in-
tellectual tool by which man could seek to discern the laws which 
govern the broad spectrum of human activities.257 The Newtonian ap-
proach was the basis for the work of many writers in diverse areas in-
cluding John Locke (epistemology), David Hume (ethics and morality), 
Adam Smith (economics), Locke and Voltaire (politics), Thomas Ried 
(moral philosophy), and finally, William Petty, Michel Turgot, Jean 
253. Lupu, supra note 237, at 1040-41. 
254. Enlightenment was a movement of thought and belief, developed from inter-
related conceptions of God, reason, nature, and man, to which there was wide assent in 
Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries. Its dominant conviction was that right reason-
ing could find true knowledge and could lead mankind to felicity. 
255. If any one event can be designated the starting point for the Era it would be the 
1687 publication of Isaac Newton's Philosophical Naturals Principia Mathematic by the 
Royal Society in London. The Royal Society itself and been formed in 1663 for the promo-
tion of seeking new knowledge, particularly of a scientific nature. From its beginning 
until1783, 39 of the individuals elected to the society were from North America. STEARNS, 
supra note 26, at 107-08. 
256. A letter written by Benjamin Franklin 90 years later confirmed this as his pro-
cess of inquiry: "[B]ut I approve much more your method of philosophizing which proceeds 
upon actual observations, makes a collection of facts and concludes no farther than those 
facts will warant." C. VAN DOREN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 660 (1938) [hereinafter cited as 
VAN DoREN]. 
257. B. HINDLE, THE PuRSUIT OF SCIENCE IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 1735-1789, at 318 
(1956) [hereinafter cited as HINDLE]; WILLS, supra note 76, at 95. 
HeinOnline -- 19 Duq. L. Rev. 713 1980-1981
1981 Scientific Inquiry 713 
Condordet, and Francios-Jean Chastellus (government).258 These in-
dividuals, among others, constituted the bridge between Newtonian 
science and the political concerns of the American colonies. 
The colonial leaders of the mid-eighteenth century, while ap-
preciating the practical consequences of science in such areas as farm-
ing and manufacturing, also sought to apply the principles of science to 
human affairs. "The Enlightenment recognized no fundamental dif-
ferences between knowledge of physics and astronomy and knowledge 
of government and economics."259 Many persons, including many 
political leaders, believed that application of the Newtonian process to 
all human endeavors would utlimately yield laws as precise as the 
physical sciences.260 
Science during the period in question was not a separate category 
engaged in by a specialist, rather it was a philosophical outlook that 
applied the principles of Bacon and Newton to all human endeavors.281 
Research in "hard" sciences like physics, chemistry, and astronomy 
was not of overwhelming importance during this period. While many 
hoped that the application of hard science would result in technological 
innovation, the true importance of science was not the practical, 
technical consequences but the intellectual framework that was applied 
to so many human endeavors. 
Discovering historical information to substantiate the assertion that 
Newtonian thought was part of the intellectual process of the time is 
very difficult.262 Because of its broad acceptance there was little discus-
sion of the fundamental principles. In order to establish that American 
institutions held scientific inquiry in high esteem, one must examine 
the attitudes, education, and accomplishments of the leaders of these 
institutions. 
During the eighteenth century, the curricula of various colleges 
were fairly uniform. All students studied basically the same material; 
there was no system of electives as presently exists in higher educa-
258. Francois-Jean Chastellus had a calculus by which one could determine whether or 
not a particular ruler was a tyrant. See WILLS, supra note 76, at 111-48. 
259. HINDLE, supra note 257, at 377. 
260. Hindle observes, "Acceptance of prevailing political concepts rested upon and 
demanded acceptance of the central importance of science. The more the Americans 
clarified their own political position, the more it came to seem desirable to promote 
science in all its phases." Id. at 382. 
261. STEARNS, supra note 26, at 5-6. 
262. From a modern perspective, it is equivalent to trying to generate material to sup-
port the position that the free enterprise system was accepted by the vast majority of in-
dividuals in the United States during the 1950-60's. If one cannot use public opinion polls, 
which did not exist during the early American history, what may be used to prove the 
proposition? 
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tion.283 One scholar has estimated that twenty to twenty-five percent of 
college study was devoted to scientific topics.264 An examination of the 
textbooks and teaching approaches of the time reveals that the prin-
ciples of Newton and the Englightenment predominated.265 Thus, 
graduates of eighteenth century American universities were well versed 
in science and scientific thought. They were familiar with the simplicity 
and perfection of Newton's laws and were taught that the use of 
Newton's rational scientific methods would lead to true knowledge. 
Many of these university graduates went on to become the leaders 
of the American revolution. Of the fifty-six signers of the Declaration 
of Independence, twenty-six had college educations.266 In addition to 
those with college training, another thirteen signers received less formal 
education by tutors or professional training in law or medicine.267 
Others who also played an important role in the revolution and who 
would go on to help draft the Constitution were also university trained.268 
Further evidence supporting the importance of science in this period 
can be found in the scientific interests and accomplishments of many of 
the Revolutionary leaders. George Washington was a surveyor and 
agronomist, Nathaniel Green was a manufacturer and inventor, Josiah 
Bartlett was a medical authority, and Manasseh Cutler an astronomer 
and botanist.269 
263. T. HORNBERGER, SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT IN THE AMERICAN COLLEGES 22-34 (1946) 
[hereinafter cited as HORNBERGER]. 
264. The list included mathematics, natural philosophy, chemistry, agriculture, 
astronomy, and natural history. Id. at 29. 
265. ld. at 48-69. See also D. STRUIK. YANKEE SCIENCE IN THE MAKING 24-26 (1948) 
[hereinafter cited as STRUIK]. 
266. Harvard: Samuel Adams (1740), John Adams (1755), Robert Paine (1749), Elbridge 
Gerry (1762), William Ellery (1747), William Williams (1751), William Hooper (1760). Yale: 
Oliver Wolcott (1747), Philip Livingston (1737), Lewis Morris (1746), Lyman Hall (1747). 
College of Philadelphia (now Univ. of Pa.): Francis Hopkinson (1757), William Paca (1759). 
Princeton: Benjamin Rush (1762), Richard Stockton (1748). William & Mary: Carter Brax-
ton (1761), Benjamin Harrison, Thomas Jefferson (1760-62). Foreign Studies: John Withers-
poon (Univ. of Edinburg, 1739), James Wilson (Univ. of Edinburg, 1763) Charles Carroll 
(French Jesuit Colleges), Richard Henry Lee (Wakefield, England), Thomas Nelson (Christ 
College, Cambridge, England), John Penn (Univ. of Geneva 1747-51), Edward Rutledge 
(London), Arthur Middleton (England). 
267. Doctors: John Bartlett, Matthew Thornton. Lawyers (with date of admission): 
Roger Sherman (1754), Jason Smith (1745), George Ross (1750), George Read (1753), 
Thomas McKean (1754), Samuel Chase (1761), Thomas Stone (1764), George Wythe, George 
Walton (1774), Thomas Heyward (1771). Education by private tutor: Francis Lightfoot Lee, 
John Morton. 
268. Alexander Hamilton attended Kings College, James Madison was a graduate of 
Princeton (1771), and both John Marshall and James Monroe attended William and Mary 
College. 
269. STRUIK. supra note 265, at 40. 
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David Rittenhouse, one of America's first astronomers, was also active 
in the American Revolution.270 He was close to the Adams faction in 
Congress271 and was also a personal friend and long-time correspondent 
of Jefferson.272 Jefferson considered Rittenhouse America's supreme 
mechanic.273 
John Adams, who is best remembered for his leadership in the fight 
for the adoption of the Declaration of Independence, showed con-
siderable support for, and interest in, science.274 After receiving his formal 
education in science and mathematics at Harvard he continued to pursue 
his interest in these areas. His library contained works by Archimedes, 
Euclid, Newton, Halley, Buffon, and Linaeus.275 Adams was also in-
terested in scientific collections and while in France visited such collec-
tions when time permitted.276 So great was Adams' devotion to the ad-
vancement of science that even the war could not deter his efforts. In 
1779 he persuaded the Massachusetts General Court to charter the 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences.277 Adams, as well as such 
famous political leaders as John Hancock and James Bowdorn, were 
among the sixty-two charter members.278 
Adams' great interest in science also influenced his view of political 
events and the operation of government. He viewed the events sur-
270. See WILLS, supra note 76, at 100-14. 
271. All of the delegates to Congress had received complimentary copies of his great 
address on astronomy. Id. at 31. 
272. Id. at 30. 
273. The term mechanic meant one who dealt with Newtonian physics. Id. at 100. 
274. See STRUIK, supra note 265, where the author writes: 
John Adams' scientific interests are illustrated in a letter to Benjamin Waterhouse, 
concerning the education of his son, John Quincy Adams, in Paris. In this letter 
Adams writes that he "attempted a sublime ffight" and after the books of Euclid in 
Latin, plane trigonometry, algebra and conic sections, tried to give him "some idea 
of the differential method of calculation of the Marquis de l'Hopital, and the method 
of fluxions and infinite series of Sir Isaac Newton." 
Id. at 362. 
275. Id. at 42. 
276. Id. at 43. 
277. The Academy was organized by Adams with the help of James Bowdorn, Dr. 
Samuel Cooper, Manasseh Cutler, and Ipswich Hamlet. STEARNS, supra note 26, at 683. 
The goals and purposes of the Academy are stated in its charter: 
As the Arts and Sciences are the foundation and support of agriculture, manufac-
ture and commerce; as they are necessary to the wealth, peace, independence, and 
happiness of the people; as they essentially promote the honor and dignity of the 
government which patronizes them; and as they are most effectually cultivated and 
diffused through a State by the forming and incorporating of men of genius and 
learning into public societies .••. 
STRUIK, supra note 265, at 44. 
278. STRUIK, supra note 265, at 44-45. 
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rounding the Revolution as a process open to scientific observation and 
description.279 When the Constitution was criticized as not sufficiently 
scientific, Adams sought to refute the charge by using the scientific 
method to analyze the parallel growth of science and government.280 
Thomas Jefferson was in the forefront of scientific thought in 
Revolutionary America. While Jefferson enjoyed tinkering and propos-
ing ideas and theories, he was not an experimenter like Franklin.281 J ef-
ferson adopted the scientific or Newtonian philosophy and applied it to 
all his endeavors. This outlook is clearly reflected in his two major 
writings. The first was the Declaration of Independence: "The Declara-
tion's opening is Newtonian. It lays down the law ... these few words 
put us firmly in the age of scientific revolution. In the flow of things 
there is perceivable necessity, a fixity within flux." 282 In his book In-
venting America, Gary Wills devotes a seventy page section to show-
ing how Jefferson's Newtonian outlook was reflected in the Declaration 
of Independence.283 Jefferson's approach was not scientific in today's 
technical sense, but it was as if the glasses by which he viewed the 
world were tinted with the colors of science. 
Jefferson's second major writing, and his only book-length work, 
was Notes on the State of Virginia.284 As noted by one editor, the book 
is representative of the Newtonian approach in its clear observation 
and recording of detailed descriptions. In a time when most scientific 
activity in America consisted of gathering information of the natural 
world, this book stands out as a prime example of scientific work.285 
279. WILLS, supra note 76, at 95. 
280. Hindle states: 
John Adams' Defence of the Constitutions was an endeavor to refute the charge by 
applying scientific principles to the evaluation of government. "The arts and 
sciences, in general," he began, "during the three or four last centuries, have had a 
regular course of progressive improvement ... is it not unaccountable that the 
knowlege of the construction of free governments, in which the happiness of life, 
and even the further progress of improvement in education and society, in 
knowledge and virtue, are so deeply interested, should have remained at a full 
stand for two or three thousand years?" He went on the classify and characterize 
many ancient and modern governments much as the botanists classified their 
plants. 
HINDLE, supra note 257, at 377. 
281. WILLS, supra 76, at 99, 131. 
282. Id. at 93. 
283. /d. at 91-164. 
284. THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 187-288. (A. Koch & W. 
Peden eds. 1944) [hereinafter cited as LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS). 
285. In introducing the work, the editors state: 
Important not only as a notable contribution to American scientific writing (form-
ulating priciples of scientific geography later developed by von Humboldt), it has 
been praised by reputable twentieth-century historians of science as the most in-
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In the case of Jefferson it is fairly easy to determine the influences 
that helped shape his ultimate philosophy. Professor William Small and 
Lieutenant Governor Francis Fauquier were two of the key influences 
on young Jefferson while he studied at the College of William and 
Mary,286 and when he subsequently studied law. Both men can be 
directly linked to the philosophy of the Enlightenment. William Small, 
the Scottish professor, was extensively trained in Enlightenment 
thought287 and, as a professor of natural philosophy, was responsible for 
teaching many categories of modern science.288 He was one of the 
bridges between Newtonian physics and men like Jefferson who acted 
upon the Newtonian belief that even human actions were governed by 
natural laws. 
Francis Fauquier was born in London and resided as a country 
gentlemen in Hertfordshire until sent to represent the Crown's inter-
est in Virginia. His family background and professional life included a 
number of connections to science.289 It is not unlikely that his interest 
in the science influenced Jefferson. 
Jefferson's noted biographer, Dumas Malone, summarized this form-
ative period of his life by saying: 
There is little question that, before he stepped on the public stage, 
he had arrived at his abiding conviction that human intelligence can 
unlock not only the treasure house of the past but also the secrets of 
the universe, thus leading mankind onward to a richer and better life, 
and that he personally was proceeding on that assumption.290 
Evidence of Jefferson's attitude toward the importance of Newton-
ian reasoning can be found in his correspondence, much of it coming 
after his two terms as President.291 Later in his life Jefferson referred 
fluential scientific book written by an American. The Notes continue to be of in· 
terest for the clarity, vigor, and occasional beauty of Jefferson's prose. 
Id. at 186. 
286. D. MALONE, JEFFERSON THE VmGINIAN 102-03 (1948) [hereinafter cited as MALONE]. 
287. For a discussion of the broad impact of Scottish thinking on Americans, see 
WILLS. supra note 76, at 175-80. Some of Professor Small's friends included James Watt 
(inventor of the steam engine) and Erasmus Darwin (grandfather of Charles Darwin and 
active in science himself). MALONE, supra note 286, at 53. 
288. When Jefferson arrived, "[Small] was there, teaching physics, metaphysics, and 
mathematics, and through force of circumstances was soon teaching practically everything 
else." MALONE, supra note 286, at 51. Another author considers Small to have been the 
greatest rival of Professor Winthrop of Harvard. HORNBERGER, supra note 263, at 61. 
289. MALONE, supra note 286, at 76. 
290. Id. at 101. 
291. In a 1789 letter to Dr. Willard, President of Harvard, Jefferson commented upon 
how open the field of natural history, botany, mineralogy, and zoology in America ap-
peared to be: 
It is the work to which the young men, whom you are forming, should lay their 
hands. We have spent the prime of our lives in procuring them the precious bles-
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to Bacon, Locke, and Newton as the trinity of immortals that initiated 
the great intellectual revolution of the Enlightenment.292 While "Jeffer-
son did not introduce the Enlightenment into the colonies . . . he 
became its almost perfect embodiment and, after Franklin, its most 
conspicuous apostle on this side of the Atlantic."293 
No man did more for the advancement of science during the Revolu-
tionary period than Benjamin Franklin, an authentic American hero. 
He was a great scientist in his own right, a leader in the promotion of 
scientific education and scientific organizations, inventor, author, and 
diplomat.294 
Franklin was probably America's first true experimentalist. His best 
known work was in the field of electricity. In the six years between 
17 46 and 1752 Franklin made his fundamental contributions in this 
area when he flew the famous kite establishing that lightning was elec-
tricity and had a fluid nature.295 Through periodic publications he in-
formed the scientific world of his work in electricity.296 Because of his 
remarkable efforts in this area, he received several awards, the ad-
miration and respect of scientists worldwide and the wondrous praise 
of the public.297 Throughout his life Franklin continued to pursue scien-
tific questions. As was typical of the period, the scope of his interest 
sing of liberty. Let them spend theirs in showing that it is the great parent of 
science and of virtue; and that a nation will be great in both, always in proportion 
as it is free. 
LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 284, at 468. 
In a letter to General Kosciusko in 1810, Jefferson discussed his life at Monticello, and 
his new role helping young men in their studies. "In advising the course of their reading, 
I endeavor to keep their attention fixed on the main object of all science [i.e., knowledge 
gained by Newtonian thought] the freedom and happines of man." Id. at 600. 
A final example can be found in the last letter Jefferson is known to have written. In 
this June 1826 letter he reflected upon the 50th anniversary of American independence 
and stated: 
That form [of government] which we have substituted, restores the free right to 
the unbounded exercise of reason and freedom of opinion. All eyes are opened, or 
opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already 
laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been 
born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to 
ride them legitimately, by the grace of God. These are grounds of hope for others. 
Id. at 729-30. 
292. MALONE, supra note 286, at 101. 
293. Id. at 101-02. 
294. See generally VAN DoREN, supra note 256. 
295. Id. at 156-64. 
296. Some of his publications included Opinions and Conjectures, concerning the Pro-
perties and Effects of the Electrical Matter (1749) and Experiments and Observations on 
Electricity (1751). His writings were translated into French, German, and Italian, and 
even as late as 1769 he was releasing an updated 4th edition. Id. at 160, 162, 171, 248. 
297. Id. at 174, 661. 
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encompassed meteorology, zoology, physics, chemistry, geology, and 
oceanography. 298 
Franklin also sought to promote science among the various societal 
institutions of the period. As early as 1743, Franklin outlined a com-
prehensive plan for the cooperative promotion of science on an inter-
colonial basis. Within a year, his plan was begun with the formation of 
the American Philosophical Society .299 Franklin also argued forcefully 
in favor of advanced training in the useful arts and sciences by the form-
ation of a college in Pennsylvania.300 In all of these endeavors, Franklin 
displayed his belief in the noble dream of the Enlightenment, that 
Man, by studied effort, could unlock the secrets of the universe and apply 
them to increase his power "over matter and multiply the conven-
iences or pleasures of life."301 
As has been shown, science was an integral part of the lives of the 
founding fathers. These men incorporated their scientific perspective 
and approach into the developing American institutions. By the time 
the Declaration of Independence was drafted, science was central to 
the thought of many American leaders and provided a mechanism and 
intellectual basis for the Revolutionary argument and for the subse-
quent formation of a constitutional government. The founding fathers 
also believed that science would provide the information and 
technology necessary to advance the material well-being of America's 
citizens, allowing them to fully enjoy the liberties secured for them by 
their government. During the next century this heritages was not 
abandoned: the infant American science began to develop into the 
modern giant we know today. Modern American institutions impliedly 
demonstrate that inquiry is a right of paramount stature because 
science became a part of the very fabric of these institutions. 
b. Value to Contemporary Society 
In order to achieve the status of a fundamental right, contem-
porary society must highly value scientific inquiry.302 Unlike other 
298. In the area of meteorology, Franklin suggested a theory for the movement of air 
masses as creating storm fronts, he conducted experiments concerning the actions of ants 
and pigeons, made a proposal on the nature of light, and conducted an observation of a 
whirlwind. Later while in England he helped Hadley conduct chemical experiments on 
evaporation. He also conducted experiments to show how different colors of cloth absorbed 
light and the sun's heat. Other scientific efforts included observations and theories concern· 
ing geology, and various experiments on the motion of water. I d. at 174-82, 278, 295, 660, 442. 
299. Id. at 138-41. 
300. Franklin draft~d a detailed proposal entitled "Proposals Relating to the Educa· 
tion of Youth in Pennsylvania" (1743). Id. at 189-93. 
301. HINDLE. supra note 257, at 1. 
302. While there are no cases which expressly mandate this second requirement, it is 
the logical consequence of the process that seeks to discover unenumerated rights. This 
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claimed liberties such as the right to an abortion or homosexual 
rights,303 scientific inquiry has broad public support and does not 
stimulate social abhorrence. Perhaps no single activity is held in 
higher esteem by the public than science.304 The importance of science 
is demonstrated by the National Science and Technology Organization 
Priorities Act of 1976.305 In this Act, Congress acknowledged the pro-
found impact of science on society and the interrelation of scientific, 
economic, social, political, and institutional factors and declared that: 
"the general welfare, the security, the economic health and stability of 
the Nation, the conservation and efficient utilization of its natural and 
human resources, and the effective functioning of government and 
society require vigorous, perceptive support and employment of 
science and technology in achieving national objectives .... "306 
Congress specifically found that science "when properly fostered, 
applied, and directed, can effectively assist in improving the quality of 
life," in resolving critical problems, in strengthening the Nation's inter-
national economic position, and in furthering foreign policy objectives.307 
Congress also found that federal funding of science was indispensable 
to sustained national progress and human betterment.308 
Not only has Congress recognized that science has been important 
to our society, but it has turned to science to help solve national prob-
lems. Congress has stated: 
The six broad national goals to which science and technology are 
called upon to contribute are (1) those of foreign policy, (2) a healthy 
national economy, (3) the special needs of food and energy, (4) the na-
tional security in its broadest sense, (5) the national health, and (6) a 
satisfying total environment, natural and man-made, urban and rural.309 
Science can effect foreign policy in a number of different ways. It 
has been recognized that technology transfer (the by-product of 
science) plays an important role in establishing relations with the 
element of the test may be an important factor in the Court's subjective decision to grant 
certiorari. Lupu, supra note 237, at 1047-50. 
303. Id. at 1046. 
304. Evidence of surveys conducted in 1972, 1974, and 1976 indicates that the public 
continues to have an overwhelmingly positive general reaction to science and technology. 
The public's esteem for scientists in 1976 was second only to its esteem for physicians. 
Seventy-one percent of the populace consider that science and technology have changed 
life for the better. Only seven percent consider the change to have been for the worse. 
Contrary to Fears, Public is High on Science, 199 SciENCE 1420-23 (1978). 
305. 42 U.S.C §§ 6601-6671 (1976, Supp. I 1977, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. III 1979). 
306. 42 U.S.C. § 6601(a)(1). 
307. Id. § 6601(a)(3). 
308. Id. § 6601(a)(4). • 
309. H.R. REP. No. 595, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 880, 908. 
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Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the People's Republic of China.310 
Foreign policy goals can also be furthered by the creation and 
severance of scientific ties.311 Finally, science can be a component of the 
aid provided to third world countries.312 
The national economy is dependent upon a vigorous science pro-
gram. Over sixty-billion dollars per year is expended by the govern-
ment and private sector on basic research, applied research, and 
development.313 Science is an increasingly indispensable source of im-
provement to the entire economy.314 The knowledge gained by scientific 
inquiry engenders inventions, techniques, and processes that produce 
innovations and efficiencies throughout our economic and social 
systems.315 This broad-based technology in turn generates the abun-
dance of material goods and services that support the high standard of 
living in the United States.316 
Science also is important at a more fundamental level. Were it not 
for the significant achievements of the agricultural scientist, society's 
ability to feed itself would be in jeopardy. Some of the breakthroughs 
include the development of high-yield, disease-resistant varieties of 
plants; chemical and biological control of weeds, pests, and diseases; 
and the genetic control of livestock production.317 If world population 
310. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE (Nov. 
1979). 
311. As part of the normalization of relations between the United States and the 
Peoples Republic of China, a five-year umbrella agreement delineating rules for 
cooperative research and scientific exchanges has been signed. U.S.-Sino Agreements on 
Science, 115 Sci. NEWS 83 (1979). 
In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Council of the National Academy 
of Science voted to suspend all symposia, seminars, and workshops for a period of six 
months. NAS Cuts Soviet Tie, 117 Sci. NEws 135 (1980). 
312. The United States, through NASA, made available a communications satellite to 
India so that programs on family planning, agriculture, and adult education could be 
broadcast to 4000 Indian villages. U.S. Discusses Progress and Challenges in Space 
Technology and Law in U.N. Outer Space Committee, DEP"T STATE BULL. 206, 207 
(1976). 
313. For the 1981 federal budget, the administration has proposed $50 billion for basic 
research and another $36 billion for research and development. 117 Sci. NEWS 70 (1980). In 
addition, at least another $20 billion per year will be spent by the private sector. It has 
been estimated that each person engaged in research and development (R&D) generates 
six to ten other jobs in the economy. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, APPLICATIONS OF 
R&D IN THE CIVIL SECTOR (June 1978) [hereinafter cited as APPLICATIONS OF R&D]. 
314. Rosenburg, The Role of Science and Technology in the National Development of 
the United States, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 151-63 (W. Beranek 
& G. Ranis eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Rosenburg]. 
315. See APPLICATIONS OF R&D, supra note 313, at iii. 
316. See Daniels, Science and Human Welfare, in SCIENCE AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 
201-02 (F. Crosson ed. 1967); Rosenburg, supra note 314, at 151-63. 
317. Pickstock, Food Resources and Population, in SCIENCE FACT 416 (F. George ed. 
1978). 
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continues to increase, science must continue to innovate to provide 
adequate food supply.318 
Energy is one of the most difficult problems facing society.319 All 
currently available energy sources suffer from severe limitations. Fos-
sil fuels are finite and will eventually be exhausted; fission energy pro-
duces hazardous waste and the risk of nuclear disasters.320 Modern 
society is dependent upon science to discover alternative energy 
sources.321 
National security also is heavily dependent on science. Beginning 
with World War II science has played increasing role in national 
defense.322 Modern warfare relies heavily on technologically 
sophisticated weapons.323 A scientific breakthrough in weapons de-
velopment by one country can give it an overwhelming superiority 
over another. Without a strong commitment to scientific research the 
defense posture of the United States could be greatly weakened. 
The role of science in medicine has greatly expanded in the past 
decades.324 As a result of the application of the knowledge gained from 
scientific inquiry, many new preventive, diagnostic and therapeutic 
tools are currently available.325 Through the use of antibiotics, vaccines, 
318. Id. at 414-47. Some areas which may produce significant breakthroughs include 
developing man-made plants, developing self-fertilizing plants, new sources of food for 
animals, and intensive horticulture. 
319. Cohen observes: 
The key to such a technology must be cheap and abundant energy. With cheap and 
abundant energy and a reasonable degree of inventiveness man can find substitutes 
for nearly anything: virtually unlimited quantities of iron and aluminum for metals, 
hydrogen for fuels and so on. Without cheap and abundant energy the options are 
much narrower and must surely lead back to a quite primitive existence. 
Cohen, The Disposal of Radioactive Waste from Fission Reactors, SciENTIFIC AM., June 
1977, at 31. 
320. Ausness, High-Level Radioactive Waste Management: The Nuclear Dilemma, 
1979 WIS. L. REV. 707, 711. 
321. Science may find an answer to the energy crisis in such areas as fission power, 
solar energy, or wind power. Conway, Energy in SCIENCE FACT 383-99 (F. George ed. 
1978). The solution may be found in some unforeseeable area such as alcohol-producing 
bacteria. 116 Sci. NEWS 317 (1979). 
322. The premier example was the Manhattan project which developed the first 
atomic bomb. LAPP, supra note 19, at 45-55. 
323. These weapons include: ICBM missile armed with MIRV warheads, anti-ballistic 
missile systems, laser weapons, satellite reconaissance and surveillance systems, and 
chemical and biological warfare agents. Archer, Defense and Weapons Research and 
Development in SCIENCE FACT 210-23 (F. George ed. 1978). 
324. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ASSESSING THE EFFICACY AND SAFETY OF 
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES (Sept. 1978). 
325. During the past three decades, there has been a remarkable growth in the 
development and use of diagnostic technologies. A wide array of new devices has been 
developed, greatly extending the ability to diagnose medical problems. New technologies 
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and other techniques, diseases such as malaria, yellow fever, typhoid, 
tuberculosis, measles, and poliomyelitis have been virtually eliminated.326 
In addition, relief of pain, amelioration of symptoms, and rehabilitation 
are now possible for many persons who previously could not have been 
treated at all. These and many other advances have led to a substan-
tial improvement in American public health. 
In the future it is expected that science will provide new insights into 
such areas as aging, fetal development, the human mind, deciphering 
the genetic code, cancer, and heart disease.327 
As can be seen from foregoing examples, science and its products 
have a profound impact on such diverse areas of our society as foreign 
policy, economics, and national defense. Nevertheless, the influence of 
science is even more pervasive. The scientific approach has been 
adopted by many of our institutions as the basic model for decision 
making. All branches of the federal government rely upon the scien-
tific approach in carrying out their assigned functions. 
Congress has recognized the importance of employing science and 
scientific knowledge in the decision-making process.328 In areas such as 
air pollution control, handling of toxic substances, and operation of 
fisheries, Congress has mandated that the administrative agencies use 
scientific information as part of their regulatory activities.329 
In order to insure continuous access to scientific information for 
itself, Congress has found it necessary to provide for official scientific 
advisors through the creation of the Office of Technology 
include automated clinical laboratory equipment, electronic fetal monitoring, am-
niocentesis, electrocardiography (EKG), electroencephalography (EEG), fiberoptic en-
doscopy of the upper and lower gastrointestinal tracts, ultrasound, mammography, and 
computed tomography. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
COMPUTED TOMOGRAPHY SCANNER 3-4 (August, 1978). 
326. Without the basic research which discovered the three antigenic types of 
poliovirus, for example, the development of the Salk vaccine would not have been possi-
ble. Thomas, Hubris in Science? 200 SCIENCE 1459, 1461 (1978). 
327. Newell, Medicine and Surgery: To 2001, in SCIENCE FACT 70-106 (F. George ed. 
1978). 
328. National Science and Technology Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6601(a)(2) (1976). 
329. In the Clean Air Act, the Administrator of the EPA is directed to establish a na-
tional research and development program. 42 U.S.C § 7403 (Supp. m 1979). In setting the 
national air pollution standards the administrator must take into account the latest scien· 
tific knowledge. Id. § 7408(b). Under the Toxic Substance Control Act, if the Adminstrator 
believes a substance presents an unreasonable risk, the substance may be subjected to a 
battery of tests for conditions including carcinogenesis, mutagenesis, teratogenesis, 
behavioral disorders, and cumulative or synergistic effects. 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (1976). In 
order to protect the national resource of fisheries, Congress has required the development 
of a fisheries management plan which makes extensive use of the biological and ecological 
sciences. 16 U.S.C § 1853 (1976, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. ill 1979). 
HeinOnline -- 19 Duq. L. Rev. 724 1980-1981
724 Duquesne Law Review Vol.19:651 
Assessment.33° Congress has also provided the President with scientific 
advisors through the creation of the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy.331 In addition to these internal advisory bodies, the government 
also has access to the resources of the nation's scientific community 
through the National Science Foundation.332 
In addition to the acquisition of scientific information, all branches 
of government employ scientific methodology to varying degrees in 
carrying out their functions. The executive branch places an increasing 
reliance upon the scientific method in carrying out its responsibilities. 
In fact, the work of the executive branch of government has been 
described as the science of public administration.333 A major component 
of the executive function is decision making and the steps employed in 
the executive decision-making process closely parallel those of the 
scientific method.334 Theodore Sorensen, advisor to President John F. 
Kennedy has described the mechanics of White House decision making 
as follows: 
330. The congressional findings and declaration of purpose in the Act which created 
the Office of Technology Assessment state: 
(b) Therefore, it is essential that, to the fullest extent possible, the consequences 
of technological applications be anticipated, understood, and considered in deter-
mination of public policy on existing and emerging national problems. 
(d) Accordingly, it is necessary for the Congress to-
(1) equip itself with new and effective means for securing competent, unbiased in-
formation concerning the physical, biological, economic, social, and political effects 
of such applications .... 
2 U.S.C. § 471 (1976). For a discussion of the Technology Assessment Act of 1972, see 
Hanslowe & Oberer, Science, Technology, Law: The Good Life, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 32 
(1973). 
331. The function of this advisor is to "advise the President of scientific and 
technological considerations involved in areas of national concern including, but not 
limited to, the economy, national security, health, foreign relations, [and] the 
environment." 42 U.S.C. § 6613 (1976). 
332. 42 U.S.C. § 1862 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
333. The science of public administration has been described as follows: 
Administration has to do with getting things done; with the accomplishment of 
defined objectives. The science of administration is thus the system of knowledge 
whereby men may understand relationships, predict results, and influence out-
comes in any situation where men are organized at work together for a common 
purpose. Public administration is that part of the science of adminstration which 
has to do with government, and thus concerns itself primarily with the executive 
branch, where the work of government is done, though there are obviously ad-
ministrative problems also in connection with the legislative and judicial branches. 
Public administration is thus a division of political science, and one of the social 
sciences. 
Gulick, Science, Values and the Public Administration, in THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 
AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 98 (L. Gawthrop ed. 1970). 
334. See notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra. 
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first: agreement on the facts; 
second: agreement on the overall policy objective; 
third: a precise definition of the problem; 
fourth: a canvassing of all possible solutions, with all their shades 
of variations; 
fifth: a list of all the possible consequences that would flow 
from each solution; 
sixth: a recommendation and final choice of one alternative; 
seventh: the communication of that selection; and 
eight: provision for its execution.335 • 
As can be seen, these steps include data gathering, data analysis, form-
ulation of hypotheses, the drawing of conclusions, communication and 
finally experimentation, which is analogous to the implementation of 
the decision.336 
Although the decision-making process in Congress is more complex, 
it too incorporates many of the basic elements of the scientific ap-
proach. The committee structure, which is the beginning point for con-
gressional action, performs the data gathering and much of the 
preliminary analysis.337 From the preliminary work of the committees, 
Congress formulates a hypothesis in the form of a bill. This bill, when 
enacted and implemented as a statute becomes an experiment to test 
the hypothesis. Depending upon the results of the experiment there 
may be further amendments of the statute.333 
335, T. SORENSEN, DECISION-MAKING IN THE WHITE HOUSE 18-19 (1963). Sorensen notes 
that this theoretically ideal process is subject to limitations. Id. at 22-42. 
336. See text accompanying note 103 supra. The scientific approach was used by the 
Johnson administration in connection with a budget system. The program was developed 
to enable the government to: 
1. Identify our national goals with precision and on a continuing basis; 
2. Choose among those goals the ones that are most urgent; 
3. Search for alternative means of reaching those goals most effectively at the 
least cost; 
4. Inform ourselves not merely on next year's cost, but on the second, and third, 
and subsequent years' costs of our programs; 
5. Measure the performance of our programs to insure a dollar's worth of service 
for each dollar spent. 
Johnson, A Statement by the President, in THE ADMINISTRATION PROCESS AND 
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 8 (L. Gawthrop ed. 1970). 
337. F. CUMMINGS, CAPITOL HILL MANUAL 39-58 (1976); M. JEWELL & S. PATTERSON, 
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 416-43 (1977). 
338. This would appear to be the basic approach of Congress in dealing with the social 
and environmental issues ofthe 1960's-70's. This is not to suggest that otherfactors, politicial, 
emotional or economical, etc. did not help shape the final outcomes, but the methodology 
was scientific. In the case of the Clean Air Act, the basic act was passed in 1970 (Pub. L. 
No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676) and was subsequently amended in 1973 (Pub. L. No. 93-15, 87 
Stat. 11), 1974 (Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246), and 1977 (Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685). 
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In addition to the concepts of scientific public adminstration, ad-
ministrative agencies are also subject to the Adminstrative Procedure 
Act.339 Through the judicial review provisions of the Act, Congress has, 
in effect, required all agencies to employ the scientific method in their 
decision making.340 
The scientific approach to decision making has been so widely used 
in this society over sych a long period of time that it is sometimes 
forgotten that an indentifiable, unique process has been adopted. Alter-
natives for decision making are also available: intuition or political in-
stinct, political doctrine or religious faith, tradition, and personal feelings, 
for example. 
Governmental decisions based on religious faith occur routinely in 
the Middle East. Perhaps the most extreme example is the recent Iran-
ian Constitution which puts all political decisions into the hands of 
religious leaders.341 Tradition can also affect government policy and 
decision making. The official policy of apartheid, followed by the South 
African government, for example, is based substantially upon tradition 
rather than scientific reasoning.342 Politicial decisions also are made on 
the basis of intuition and feelings 343 or upon whim.344 
Science is largely responsible for many of the values which we accept 
339. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1976). 
340. The AP A states that in judicial review a court shall: 
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to 
be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law; 
(D) without observance of procedure required by law; 
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence ... 
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de 
novo by the reviewing court. 
Id. § 706. 
341. The new constitution is based on strict Moslem law proclaimed in the Koran. 
"Key to the clergy's control is a Council of Guardians made up of religious leaders who 
must approve measures passed by the Assembly." For the first time Moslem Mullahs are 
given complete domination over Islamic life. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Dec.10, 1979, at 22. 
342. For many years in most countries Blacks were thought of as inferior. This tradi-
tion is still alive today in South Africa. THE NATION, Aug. 11, 1979, at 104. 
343. For example, Communist China's recent "cultural revolution" appears to have 
been produced by Chairman Mao's fears of the rising intelligentsia. A. Topping, Since 
1966, A Kaleidoscope of Changes, in REPORT FROM RED CHINA 162-65 (F. Ching ed. 1971). S. 
Topping, New Dogma, New Maoist Man, in REPORT FROM RED CHINIA 258-65 (F. Ching ed. 
1971). 
344. One Western diplomat described Uganda's Idi Amin as "animal-shrewd-like a 
cornered animal who made political decisions instinctively." NEWSWEEK. Mar. 7, 1977, at 
29-35. During his regime Amin seemed content to allow ruination as long as his personal 
authority remained undiminished. AMERICA. Jan. 15, 1977, at 26-27. 
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today as permanent and self-evident.345 We are living in a society 
permeated by the scientific outlook and ethic.346 The primary compo-
nent of the scientific ethic is the habit of truth; i.e., the habit of testing 
and correcting a concept by its consequences in experience.347 From the 
habit of truth and the scientific spirit have come such values as 
respect for the individual, acceptance of the process of dissent, and 
recognition of the value of freedom of thought and inquiry.3' 8 
In summary, scientific inquiry is of vital importance to our modern 
society.349 Science has a profound impact on all of our economic, social, 
and political institutions. It is a significant factor in solving many of to-
day's national problems, Science is directly responsible for the material 
well-being and strength of our nation. The knowledge gained from 
scientific inquiry consistently has been applied to all levels of our 
society. The scientific method has been adopted by the government as 
a basis for carrying out its various functions. Finally, the scientific 
ethic has helped shape the values of our society. 
Without science and scientific inquiry the founding fathers' goals for 
individual and national self-fulfillment would have been far more dif-
ficult to achieve. Scientific inquiry, from both a historical standpoint 
and a modern perspective, is an activity of paramount stature and thus 
entitled to protection as a fundamental right. 
C. Standards of Review 
Assuming that scientific inquiry is a constitutionally protected right, 
there remains the critical task of developing the proper standard of 
345. HUMAN VALUES, supra note 20, at 51. 
346. ORIGINS OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 21, at 133. 
347. This habit of truth was suggested by Bronowski. 
In science and in art and in self-knowledge we explore and move constantly by 
turning to the world of sense to ask "Is this so?" This is the habit of truth, always 
minute yet always urgent, which for four hundred years has entered every action 
of ours; and has made our society and the value it sets on man, as surely as it has 
made the linotype machine and the scout knife, and King Lear and the Origin of 
Species and Leonardo's Lady with a Stoat. 
HUMAN VALUES, supra note 20, at 46. 
348. See generally id. at 20. "Science like the arts or literature, is necessary to a free 
society. It establishes a method of intelligent thought and thereby enhances liberty. It 
dignifies the human spirit, as do art and poetry. Scientific inquiry is an expression of 
freedom." Rieser, The Role of Science in the Orwellian Decade, 184 SCIENCE 486, 489 
(1974). 
349. Science is also the greatest hope of the human race. 
[T]he heritage of science is a heritage of hope. By greater understanding, not only 
of the physical and biological worlds but also of ourselves and the world of human 
society, we can push the evolutionary parameters toward human betterment and 
build a happier world for the human race even out of the fires of catastrophe. 
Boulding, Science: Our Common Heritage, 207 SCIENCE 831, 836 (1980). 
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review. Because of the wide variety of fact situations in which the 
rights beyond those enumerated in the Constitution arise, no one stan-
dard of review has been articulated.350 Depending upon the particular 
right involved, the standard of review ranges from requiring merely a 
rational basis,351 to requiring an important state interest352 or a compel-
ling interest353 to justify state interference. It appears that the ap-
plicability of the different tests is a function of the nature of the right 
asserted and the context in which it arises.354 The more socially signifi-
cant the right, the stricter the standard of review. 
In light of the important role which scientific inquiry plays in the 
functioning of our society it would be inappropriate to employ the ra-
tional basis standard. Under this standard a government regulation 
will be upheld if it furthers a legitimate governmental objective.355 
350. Professor Tribe has observed: 
The resulting rights have been located in the "liberty" protected by the due pro-
cess clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. They have been cut from the 
cloth of the ninth amendment-conceived as a rule against cramped construc-
tion-or from the privileges and immunities clauses of article IV and of the four-
teenth amendment. Encompassing rights to shape one's inner life and rights to control 
the face one presents to the world, they have materialized like holograms from the 
"emanations" and "penumbras"-most recently dubbed simply the "shadows"-of 
the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments. They elaborate the "blessings of 
liberty" promised in the Preamble, and have been held implicit in the eighth 
amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Wherever located, 
they have inspired among the most moving appeals to be found in the judicial lexicon. 
TRmE, supra note 46, at 893-94 (footnotes omitted). 
351. In Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976), the Court upheld a regulation governing 
hair grooming for police officers since the patrolman involved could not demonstrate that 
there was no rational connection between the regulation and the goal of promoting safety 
of persons and property. Id. at 247. · 
352. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S 494 (1977), the court held that 
because the city's zoning ordinance intruded upon the fundamental rights of the family 
the usual judicial deference to the legislature was inappropriate. The Court stated that 
"when the government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements, this 
Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and 
the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation." ld. at 499. 
353. See notes 202-07 and accompanying text supra. See generally Lupu, note 237 
supra; Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited; Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent 
Cases, 71 Nw. L. REV. 417 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Perry]; Perry, Abortion, The Public 
Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689 (1976). 
354. An example of this distinction is provided by Tribe: 
Thus a purpose adequate to justify regulating the quality of brake linings might not 
serve to justify requiring the wearing of seat belts. And one sufficient to justify 
such a requirement might in turn be thought insufficient to sustain a requirement 
targeted at a more insular group-motorcyclists, for example, instead of automobile 
drivers. 
TRIBE, supra note 46, at 891. 
355. Perry, supra note 353 at 419, 422. 
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With this test almost "any governmental objective is legitimate which 
seeks to protect psychological, as well as physical, health or to pro-
mote the economic, political, or even aesthetic well being of the 
citizenry."35ll This test leaves very little room for weighing the impor-
tance of the claimed right against the governmental objective. Even 
more importantly, the burden of proof is on the claimant to establish 
that there is no rational connection between the regulation and the 
state interest.357 Because of the important role which scientific inquiry 
plays both in the individual self-fulfillment of the scientist and the 
development of society, the rational basis test is insufficient to protect 
the right of scientific inquiry. 
Given the fundamental nature of the right of scientific inquiry a 
more strict standard is required. When dealing with fundamental or 
basic rights the Court has required that there be a substantial, impor-
tant, or compelling state interest. Furthermore, when these rights are 
involved the burden falls upon the state to demonstrate that there is a 
sufficient interest and the regulation is closely tailored to effectuate 
only those interests.358 The standard would require that the regulation 
(1) be within the constitutional power of the government, (2) further 
an important or substantial governmental interest, and (3) be no 
greater than is essential to the furtherance of the governmental inter-
est. The standard will permit the fullest possible exercise of the basic 
right of scientific inquiry while still allowing the state to protect itself 
and the health and safety of its citizens. 
This standard should be used in all cases in which the state seeks to 
regulate scientific inquiry. In the first instance the activity involved 
must satisfy the two-part definition of scientific inquiry.359 Once the 
claimant establishes that the activity is scientific inquiry, the burden 
shifts to the government to establish that its regulation meets the re-
quirements of the three-point fundamental right standard. The stan-
dard is essentially the same as the O'Brien test.360 Because of this 
similarity, the analysis of any case will follow the same pattern as that 
of the O'Brien test. Thus the results reached in the above examples of 
the fetal research, recombinant DNA, national security, and human ex-
perimentation will be the same. 
356. Id. at 424 (footnotes omitted). 
357. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. at 247. Using this approach it would be possible for a 
local government to prevent the construction of a large solar collector which would be 
used to study the fundamental characteristics of energy conversion by solar cells. The 
local government could justify the regulation based on aesthetic and potential traffic con-
gestion due to sightseers. See generally Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
358. This test was set forth in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978), where the 
Court struck down a statute which interfered with the fundamental right of marriage. 
359. See text accompanying notes 52-53 supra. 
360. See text accompanying note 170 supra. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Science and its products have already exerted a profound impact 
on society and will continue to do so. As scientific knowledge grows, so 
does man's ability to affect and manipulate himself and his environ-
ment. The changes and the risks created by scientific inquiry will in-
evitably lead to a greater demand for governmental control. This article 
proposes various approaches which can be used to balance the right of 
scientific inquiry and the state's interest in protecting itself and its 
citizens. 
Before meaningful regulation is possible, the nature of scientific in-
quiry must be more fully understood. Its goals and methods must be 
examined to determine which activities can be properly designated as 
scienfitic inquiry. Based upon this examination, the authors have pro-
posed a legal definition of scientific inquiry. 
Once the nature of scientific inquiry is examined, it is possible 
to establish a constitutional right to engage in this activity either 
under the first amendment analysis or as a fundamental right standing 
alone. The first amendment approach offers the advantage of allowing 
analysis to proceed along familiar, well traveled paths, but it presents 
the disadvantage of not accomodating the unique character of scientific 
inquiry and of requiring that certain of its non-speech components be 
characterized as speech or incidents of speech. The "Achilles Heel" of 
the first amendment approach lies in its requirement that experimen-
tation must be categorized as speech or necessary incident of speech. 
If this categorization is not accepted, the whole analysis falls apart. 
The fundamental right approach, while having the disadvantage of be-
ing novel, offers the advantage of fitting readily within the mold of 
presently recognized fundamental rights. The latter approach is 
preferable. Because it accommodates the unique character of science, it 
allows the Court to deal directly with scientific inquiry without resort-
ing to artificial characterization. This approach will also allow the 
Court maximum flexibility in dealing with the complex issues which 
will inevitably arise. Whichever approach is adopted, the standard of 
review and analysis would be equivalent. 
